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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effects of liquidity on interest rate 
option prices. Using daily bid and ask prices of euro (€) interest 
rate caps and floors, we find that illiquid options trade at higher 
prices relative to liquid options, controlling for other effects, 
implying a liquidity discount. This effect is opposite to that 
found in all studies on other assets such as equities and bonds, 
but is consistent with the structure of this over-the-counter 
market and the nature of the demand and supply forces. We also 
identify a systematic factor that drives changes in the liquidity 
across option maturities and strike rates. This common liquidity 
factor is associated with lagged changes in investor perceptions 
of uncertainty in the equity and fixed income markets.  
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Liquidity has long been recognized as an important factor driving the prices of financial assets. 
Since the seminal paper by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), several empirical studies have shown 
that stocks with lower liquidity have lower prices and command higher expected returns. From a 
theoretical perspective, Longstaff (1995a) derives an analytical upper bound for the discount in 
security prices for lack of marketability. In addition, within a partial equilibrium setting, 
Longstaff (2001) shows that trading frictions can lead to substantial implied liquidity premia. 
More recently, financial economists have focused on the commonality in liquidity across various 
assets and its implications for asset pricing. It has been documented that there is significant 
commonality in liquidity across different stocks and that liquidity risk, captured by the variation 
in the common liquidity component, is important for explaining the cross-section of stock 
returns.1 In the fixed income markets as well, starting with Amihud and Mendelson (1991), the 
evidence is that illiquidity affects bond prices adversely. Furthermore, common factors have been 
shown to drive liquidity in the Treasury and corporate bond markets.2 
Thus far, the literature has identified several stylized facts about liquidity in the stock and bond 
markets and its impact on the prices and returns of the respective assets. However, relatively little 
is known about the implications of liquidity for pricing in derivatives markets, such as those for 
equity or interest rate options. An exception in this relatively sparse literature is the study by 
Brenner, Eldor and Hauser (2001), who confirm the expected result that non-tradable currency 
options in Israel are discounted by 21 percent on average, as compared to exchange-traded 
options.3 But is this always the case? Are illiquid options always priced lower than liquid options, 
similar to the liquidity effect consistently observed in the underlying asset markets, or does this 
depend on the institutional structure of the market? Is there a common factor that explains the 
changes in liquidity across option strikes and maturities? What are the fundamental macro-
                                                          
1 See for example, Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), 
Amihud (2002) and Chordia et al. (2005), for evidence of the former, and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) for evidence of the latter. For an extensive review of this literature, see 
Amihud, Mendelsen and Pedersen (2005). 
2 See Krishnamurthy (2002) and Longstaff (2004) for evidence from the Treasury bond markets, and Elton 
et al. (2001), Longstaff et al. (2005), De Jong and Driessen (2005) and Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam 
(2006) and others for evidence from the corporate bond market. 
3 In other related studies, Vijh (1990), George and Longstaff (1993), and Mayhew (2002) examine the 
determinants of equity option bid-ask spreads, while Bollen and Whaley (2004), Cetin et al. (2006), and 
Garleanu et al. (2006) examine the impact of supply and demand effects on equity option prices.  
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economic drivers of this common liquidity factor in the options markets? We raise and answer 
these important questions using cap and floor data from the over-the-counter interest rate options 
market, which is one of the largest (and yet least researched) options markets in the world, with 
about $28 trillion in notional principal and $570 billion in gross market value outstanding as of 
December 2005.4 
Contrary to the accepted wisdom in the existing literature based on evidence from other asset 
markets, we find that more illiquid interest rate options trade at higher prices, controlling for 
other effects. This effect goes in the direction opposite to what is observed for stocks, bonds, and 
even for some exchange-traded currency options. Our paper is the first to document such a 
liquidity effect in any financial market, and is also the first one to examine liquidity effects in the 
interest rate options markets. This result has important implications for incorporating liquidity 
effects in derivative pricing models, since we show that the conventional intuition, which holds in 
other asset markets, may not hold in some derivatives markets.   
We also characterize a common factor that drives the changes in the liquidity of interest rate 
options at different strike rates and maturities. This common factor explains about one-third of 
the variation in liquidity across these options. Our results suggest that this systematic liquidity 
factor is related to the lagged changes in uncertainty in the equity and fixed income markets. This 
finding has important implications for the measurement and hedging of aggregate liquidity risk in 
interest rate option portfolios. Perceptions of greater uncertainty in these markets result in greater 
illiquidity in the interest rate options markets. We are not aware of any other study that has 
documented a common liquidity factor in any derivatives market. This investigation of the 
commonality of liquidity complements similar studies for other markets such as those for stocks, 
Treasury and corporate bonds. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. According to the available 
evidence, the impact of illiquidity on asset prices is overwhelmingly presumed to be negative, 
since the marginal investors typically hold a long position, thereby demanding compensation for 
                                                          
4 BIS Quarterly Review, June 2006, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland.  
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the lack of immediacy they face if they wish to sell the asset. Thus, the liquidity premium on the 
asset is expected to be positive ― other things remaining the same, the more illiquid an asset, the 
higher is its liquidity premium and its required rate of return, and hence, the lower is its price. For 
example, in the case of a bond or a stock, which are assets in positive net supply, the marginal 
investor or the buyer of the asset demands compensation for illiquidity, while the seller is no 
longer concerned about the liquidity of the asset after the transaction. In fact, within a two-asset 
version of the standard Lucas economy, Longstaff (2005) shows that a liquid asset can be worth 
up to 25 percent more than an illiquid asset, even if both have identical cash flow dynamics.  
However, derivative assets are different from underlying assets like stocks and bonds. First, there 
is no reason to presume that liquidity in the derivatives markets is an exogenous phenomenon. 
Rather, it is the result of the availability and liquidity of the hedging instruments, the magnitude 
of unhedgeable risks, and the risk appetite and capital constraints of the marginal investors, 
among other factors. Thus, illiquidity in derivatives markets captures all of the concerns of the 
marginal investor about the expected hedging costs and the risks over the life of the derivative. In 
particular, in the case of options, since they cannot be hedged perfectly, the dealers are keen to 
carry as little inventory as possible.  Therefore, the liquidity of the option captures the ease with 
which a dealer can offset the trade. Consequently, the liquidity of an option matters to the dealers 
and has an effect on its price. Second, derivatives are generally in zero net supply. Therefore, it is 
not obvious whether the marginal investor in derivatives holds a long or a short position. In 
addition, in the case of options, the risk exposures of the short side and the long side are not 
necessarily the same, since they may have other offsetting positions. Both the buyer and the seller 
continue to have exposures to the asset after the transaction, until it is unwound. The buyer 
demands a reduction in price to compensate for the illiquidity, while the seller demands an 
increase. Due to the asymmetry of the option payoffs, the seller has higher risk exposures than 
the buyer. The net effect of the illiquidity, which itself is endogenous, is determined in 
equilibrium, and one cannot presume ex ante that it will be either positive or negative, especially 
if the motivations of the two parties for engaging in the transaction are different.  
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This is especially true for interest rate cap and floor markets, which are over-the-counter (OTC) 
institutional markets with hardly any retail presence. The buyers of caps and floors are typically 
(buy and hold) corporations wanting to hedge their interest rate risk. The sellers (derivative desks 
at large commercial and investment banks) are concerned about hedging the risks of the caps and 
floors that they sell, and hence about the liquidity of these options, which is a proxy for such 
concerns.5 Thus, for the purposes of pricing of liquidity, the marginal investor in this market is 
likely to be net short. The size of individual trades is relatively large, with the contracts being 
long-dated portfolios of options (up to ten years maturity or more).  The long-dated contract 
creates enormous transaction costs if the seller just hedges dynamically using the underlying spot 
or derivative interest rate markets. Consequently, the market maker with a net short position may 
raise the price of illiquid options.6 Hence, illiquidity in this case has a positive relationship with 
the price, rather than the conventional negative relationship identified in the literature so far. This 
is indeed what we find, within an endogenous specification for option liquidity and prices. 
Our result can be explained in the context of deviations from the Black-Scholes world, where 
both the buyer and the seller can hedge costlessly in the underlying market; consequently, 
illiquidity should not have an effect on the price of an option. However, in the real world, options 
cannot be exactly replicated, due to stochastic volatility, jumps, discrete rebalancing or 
transaction costs.7 There are also limits to arbitrage, as outlined in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
Liu and Longstaff (2004). In addition, option dealers face model misspecification and biased 
parameter estimation risk (Figlewski (1989)). These factors result in some part of the risk in 
options being unhedgeable, leading to an upward sloping supply curve (Bollen and Whaley 
(2004), Jarrow and Protter (2005) and Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2006)). In addition, 
                                                          
5 In recent years, hedge funds have been quite active in this market.  Based on our conversations with 
practitioners in this market, we understand that these players typically have short positions in options. 
6 The results in Brenner at al. (2001), to the effect that illiquid currency options were priced lower than 
traded options, can also be explained by the same argument. In their case, illiquidity had a negative 
relationship with price. Since these options were auctioned by the Central Bank of Israel, the buyers of 
these options were the ones who were concerned about illiquidity, and not the seller. 
7 Constantinides (1997) argues that, with transaction costs, the concept of the no-arbitrage price of a 
derivative is replaced by a range of prices, which is likely to be wider for customized, over-the-counter 
derivatives (which include most interest rate options), as opposed to plain-vanilla exchange-traded 
contracts, since the seller has to incur higher hedging costs to cover short positions, if they are customized 
contracts. In a similar vein, Longstaff (1995b) shows that in the presence of frictions, option pricing models 
may not satisfy the martingale restriction. 
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since dealers in this market are net short, they may hit their capital constraints more often if they 
have to sell more options to make a market (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2006)). They would, 
therefore, ask for more compensation for providing liquidity, thus making the supply curve 
upward-sloping. 
Option liquidity is related to the slope of this upward-sloping option supply curve in three ways. 
First, the time when options become more illiquid coincides with the time the sellers face greater 
unhedgeable risks relative to their risk appetite and capital. In addition, it becomes more difficult 
for sellers to reverse their trades and earn the bid-ask spread. They face greater basis risk, since 
they have to hold an inventory of options that they cannot hedge perfectly. Second, the sellers 
face greater model risk when there is less liquidity ― when there are fewer option trades, the 
dealers have less data to reliably calibrate their pricing models. Third, as modeled in Duffie, 
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005), due to bilateral trading in OTC markets, dealers can have market 
power; hence search frictions can increase bid-ask spreads as well as liquidity premia.8 All these 
factors result in increasing the slope of the option supply curve when there is less liquidity, 
consistent with Cetin, Jarrow, Protter and Warachka (2006). The impact of a steeper supply curve 
on option prices and bid-ask spreads can be understood within the theoretical model of Garleanu, 
Pedersen and Poteshman (2006). Given the inventory of the dealer, a steeper supply curve would 
result in wider bid-ask spreads, since the difference in prices for a unit positive and a unit 
negative change in their inventory would be larger. In addition, if the net demand by the end-
users is positive (as in the case of interest rate caps and floors), a steeper supply curve will result 
in higher option prices, since the dealer is net short in the aggregate.9 In such a scenario, higher 
bid-ask spreads (lower liquidity) would be associated with higher prices, resulting in a liquidity 
discount, not a premium. Our empirical results are consistent with these implications, given the 
structure of the OTC interest rate options markets. 
                                                          
8 Admittedly, the search costs do not change much on a daily basis. Thus, the contribution of the 
mechanism in Duffie et al (2005) to our story is possibly only secondary. We are thankful to an anonymous 
referee for pointing this out. 
9 Garleanu et al (2006) do not specifically examine the relationship between illiquidity and the prices of 
derivative assets. Their main focus is on the effects of the changes in inventory on prices through 
movement along the supply curve. However, their set-up is also useful in understanding the changes in the 
slope of the supply curve and the resultant relationship between illiquidity and option prices. 
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Although there is a plethora of research on liquidity effects in equity and debt markets, 
particularly in the United States, there is scant evidence in the case of derivative markets. Using 
data from the interest rate options markets, our results underscore the fact that the positive 
relationship between liquidity and asset prices cannot be generalized to other markets without 
considering the structure of the market and the nature of the demand and supply forces. This 
fundamental point must be taken into account in both theoretical and empirical research. Since 
interest rate derivatives form a substantial proportion of the global derivatives markets, our results 
could potentially provide insights into the broad question of liquidity effects in derivatives 
markets. In addition, our investigation of the fundamental drivers of liquidity in this market may 
influence the construction of models for pricing and hedging of interest rate derivatives. 
The structure of our paper is as follows: In Section 1 we describe the data set and present 
summary statistics. After controlling for the term structure and volatility factors, a simultaneous 
equation system is employed to estimate and examine the relationship between the price (excess 
implied volatility relative to a benchmark) and the liquidity (relative bid-ask spread) of interest 
rate options. Section 2 presents the results for this relationship. Section 3 explores the 
commonality in the changes in liquidity of interest rate options across strike rates and maturities, 
and links this systematic factor to changes in macro-economic variables. Section 4 concludes with 
a summary of the main results and directions for future research.   
1. Data 
The data for this study consist of an extensive collection of euro (€) interest rate cap and floor 
prices over the 29-month period from January 1999 to May 2001, obtained from WestLB 
(Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale) Global Derivatives and Fixed Income Group. These are 
daily bid and offer price quotes over 591 trading days for nine maturities (two years to ten years, 
in annual increments) across twelve different strike rates ranging from 2% to 8%. On a typical 
day, price quotes are available for about 30-40 caps and floors, reflecting the maturity-strike 
combinations that exhibit market interest on that day. 
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WestLB is one of the dealers that subscribe to the interest rate option valuation service from 
Totem. Totem is the leading industry source for asset valuation data and services supporting 
independent price verification and risk management in the global financial markets. Most 
derivative dealers subscribe to their service. As part of this service, Totem collects data for the 
entire “skew” of caplets and floorlets across a series of maturities from its set of dealers. They 
aggregate this information and return the consensus values back to the dealers that contribute data 
to them. The market consensus values supplied to the dealers include the underlying term 
structure data, caplet and floorlet prices, as well as the prices and implied volatilities of the 
reconstituted caps and floors across strikes and maturities. Hence, the prices quoted by dealers 
such as WestLB that are a part of this service reflect market-wide consensus information about 
these products. This is especially true for plain-vanilla caps and floors, which are very high-
volume products with standardized structures that are also used by dealers to calibrate their 
models for pricing and hedging exotic derivatives. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that any 
large dealer, especially one that uses a market data integrator such as Totem, would deviate 
systematically from market consensus prices for these “plain vanilla” products. Our discussions 
with market participants confirm that the bid and ask prices quoted by different dealers 
(especially those that subscribe to Totem) for “plain vanilla” caps and floors are generally 
similar.10 
Another way to assess the representativeness of the data is to consider the competitiveness of the 
market. The euro OTC interest rate derivatives market is extremely competitive, especially for 
plain-vanilla contracts like caps and floors. The BIS estimates the Herfindahl index (sum of 
squares of market shares of all participants) for euro interest rate options (which includes exotic 
options) at about 500-600 during the period from 1999 to 2004, which is even lower than that for 
USD interest rate options (around 1,000), compared to a range of 0-10, 000 (where 0 indicates a 
perfectly competitive market and 10,000 a market dominated by a single monopolist.) The 
Henfindahl index values indicates that the OTC interest rate options market is a fairly competitive 
market; hence, it is safe to rely on option quotes from a top European derivatives dealer 
                                                          
10 The use of market dealer quotations for studying liquidity effects is consistent with several prior studies, 
including Longstaff et al. (2005). 
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(reflecting the best market consensus information available with them) like WestLB during our 
sample period. Given the competitive structure of the market, any dealer-specific effects on the 
quotes are likely to be small and unsystematic. 
This data set allows us to conduct the empirical analysis for caps and floors across strike rates. 
These caps and floors are portfolios of European interest rate options on the six-month Euribor 
with a six-monthly reset frequency. In the Appendix, we provide the details of the contract 
structure for these options. Along with the options data, we also collected data on euro swap 
rates, and the daily term structure of the euro interest rates, from the same source. These are key 
inputs necessary for conducting our empirical tests.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the midpoint of the bid and ask prices for caps and 
floors over our sample period. The prices of these options can be almost three orders of 
magnitude apart, depending on the strike rate and the maturity of the option. For example, a deep 
out-of-the-money, two-year cap may have a market price of just a few basis points, while a deep 
in-the-money, ten-year cap may be priced above 1500 basis points. Since interest rates varied 
substantially during our sample period, the data have to be reclassified in terms of “moneyness” 
(“depth in-the-money”) to be meaningfully compared over time. In Table 1, the prices of options 
are grouped together into “moneyness buckets,” by calculating the Log Moneyness Ratio (LMR) 
for each cap/floor. The LMR is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the par swap rate to the 
strike rate of the option. Therefore, a zero value for the LMR implies that the option is at-the-
money forward, since the strike rate is equal to the par swap rate. Since the relevant swap rate 
changes every day, the moneyness of the same strike rate, same maturity, option, as measured by 
the LMR, also changes each day. The average price, as well as the standard deviation of these 
prices, in basis points, are reported in the table. It is clear from the table that cap/floor prices 
display a fair amount of variability over time. Since these prices are grouped together by 
moneyness, a large part of this variability in prices over time can be attributed to changes in 
volatilities over time, since term structure effects are largely taken into account by our 
adjustment.  
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We also document the magnitude and behavior of the liquidity costs in these markets over time, 
for caps and floors across strike rates. We use the bid-ask spreads for the caps and floors as a 
proxy for the illiquidity of the options in the market. In an OTC market, this is the only measure 
of illiquidity available for these options. Other measures of liquidity common in exchange-traded 
markets such as volume, depth, market impact etc., are just not available. In our sample, we do 
observe the bid-ask spread for each option every day. Therefore, we settle for using this metric as 
a meaningful, although potentially imperfect, proxy for liquidity.11 
It is important to note that these are measures of the liquidity costs in the interest rate options 
market and not in the underlying market for swaps. Although the liquidity costs in the two 
markets may be related, the bid-ask spreads for caps and floors directly capture the effect of 
various frictions in the interest rate options market, along with the transaction costs in the 
underlying market, as well as the imperfections in hedging between the option market and the 
underlying swap market. Furthermore, unlike options on different equities, which are not directly 
related to each other, caps and floors with different strike rates and maturities all depend on the 
same underlying yield curve. In addition, the market for underlying swaps is extremely liquid (the 
typical bid-ask spreads on interest rate swaps are a couple of basis points) with hardly any time 
variation. Therefore, the transaction costs in the underlying market cannot explain any variation 
in the liquidity of caps and floors either through time or in the cross-section. In addition, the 
current bid-ask spreads for caps and floors themselves are proxies for the expected costs of 
hedging and the expected level of unhedgeable risks, since the dealers set the current bid-ask 
spreads based on their expectations of these frictions. Therefore, the current bid-ask spread of the 
option is the liquidity proxy relevant for pricing analysis. 
In Table 2, we present the relative bid-ask spreads (RelBAS), defined as the bid-ask spreads 
divided by the mid price (the average of the bid and ask prices) of the option, grouped together 
into moneyness buckets by the LMR. Close-to-the-money caps and floors have relative bid-ask 
                                                          
11 The bid-ask spread has been used as a proxy for liquidity by several prior studies, including Amihud and 
Mendelsen (1986), and has been shown to be highly correlated with other proxies for liquidity. In addition, 
in the spot fixed income markets, Fleming (2003) and Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2005) show that the 
spread quoted by market makers who supply liquidity better measures the value investors place on 
immediacy, rather than the actual trade prices or trade sizes. 
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spreads of about 8-9%, except for some of the shorter-term caps and floors that have higher bid-
ask spreads. Since deep in-the-money options (low strike rate caps and high strike rate floors) 
have higher prices, they have lower relative bid-ask spreads (3-4%). Some of the deep out-of-the-
money options have large relative bid-ask spreads ― for example, the two-year deep out-of-the-
money caps, with an average price of just a couple of basis points, have bid-ask spreads almost as 
large as the price itself, on average about 80.9% of the price. Part of the reason for this behavior 
of bid-ask spreads is that some of the costs of the market makers (transaction costs on hedges, 
administrative costs of trading, etc.) are absolute costs that must be incurred whatever may be the 
value of the option sold. However, some of the other costs of the market maker (inventory 
holding costs, hedging costs, etc.) are dependent on the value of the option bought or sold. It is 
also important to note that, in general, these bid-ask spreads are much larger than those for most 
exchange-traded options. 
For our empirical tests, we pool the data on caps and floors, since this would allow us to obtain a 
wider range of strike rates, covering rates that are both in-the-money and out-of-the-money, for 
both caps and floors. Before doing so, we check for put-call parity between caps and floors, and 
find that, on the average, put-call parity holds in our data set.12 These parity computations are a 
consistency check which assures us about the integrity of our data set. 
2. How do Liquidity and Option Prices vary? 
We use implied volatilities from the Black-BGM model, estimated using mid prices (the average 
of bid and ask) to characterize option prices throughout the analysis from here on.13 The raw 
implied volatility obtained from the Black BGM model removes underlying term structure effects 
from option prices.14 Therefore, a change in the implied volatility of an option from one day to 
                                                          
12 The results of these computations are not reported in the paper, but are available from the authors. 
13 The use of implied volatilities, from a variant of the Black-Scholes model, even though model- 
dependent, is in line with all prior studies in the literature, including Bollen and Whaley (2004). The details 
of the calculation of implied volatility are provided in the Appendix. 
14 Our implied volatility estimation is likely to have much smaller errors than those generally encountered 
in equity options (see, for example, Canina and Figlewski (1993)). We pool the data for caps and floors, 
which reduces errors due to misestimation of the underlying yield curve. The options we consider are much 
longer term (the shortest cap/floor has a two-year maturity), which reduces this potential error further. For 
most of our empirical tests, we do not include deep ITM or deep OTM options, where estimation errors are 
likely to be larger. Furthermore, since we consider the implied flat volatilities of caps and floors, rather 
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the next can be attributed to changes in interest rate uncertainty, or other effects not captured by 
the model, and not simply due to changes in the underlying term structure. We then estimate the 
excess implied volatility (EIV, similar to that used in Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2006)) 
as the difference between the implied volatility and a benchmark volatility estimated using a 
panel GARCH model on historical interest rates. We check for the robustness of our results by 
estimating the benchmark volatility using several alternative methods. The EIV is a cleaner 
measure of the expensiveness of options, since even the general level of interest rate volatility has 
been factored out of the implied volatility of each option contract. In addition, in the empirical 
tests where we use EIV, we control for the shape of the volatility smile (using functions of LMR), 
and use several term structure variables as well as approximate controls for the skewness and 
excess kurtosis in the underlying interest rate distribution. In the presence of these controls, the 
changes in the EIV for a particular option cannot be attributed to changes in the underlying term 
structure or to changes in the general level of interest rate volatility. Therefore, the EIV can be 
effectively used to examine factors, such as liquidity, other than the underlying term structure or 
interest rate uncertainty that may affect option prices in this market.15 In the rest of the paper, we 
use the EIV as a measure of the expensiveness of the option, for every strike and maturity. 
2.1. Panel GARCH Model for Benchmark Volatility 
The GARCH models proposed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) have been extended to 
explain the dynamics of the short-term interest rate by Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), Brenner, 
Harjes, and Kroner (1996), Cvsa and Ritchken (2001), and others. These studies find that for 
modeling interest rate volatility, it is important to allow the volatility to depend both on the level 
of interest rates and on unexpected information shocks. The asymmetric volatility effect as 
modeled in Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (GJR, 1993) has also been found to improve 
volatility forecasts. In particular, these studies recommend using a GJR-GARCH (1,1) model 
with a square-root type level dependence in the volatility process. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
than spot volatilities, the errors are even further reduced due to the implicit “averaging” in this 
computation. The “flat” volatility is the weighted average of the volatilities for all the caplets/floorlets in a 
cap/floor, while the “spot” volatility is the volatility of an individual caplet/floorlet. 
15 Changes in the EIV, in the presence of these controls, are somewhat analogous to the excess returns used 
in asset pricing studies.  
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However, for estimating the relevant benchmark volatilities for caps/floors, we need to model 
forward rate volatilities. These present an additional challenge, since the volatilities for different 
forward rate maturities, while being different, are linked together due to the common factors that 
drive the entire term structure of interest rates. Therefore, the entire term structure of forward rate 
volatilities must be estimated simultaneously in an internally consistent modeling framework. We 
extend this literature and develop a panel GARCH model with the following process for forward 
rates: 
 
…..(1) 
 
 
where ft,T is the six-month tenor forward rate, T periods forward, observed at time t. This is a 
panel version of the GJR-GARCH(1,1) model with square-root level dependence. It is a 
parsimonious yet very flexible model that nests many widely used GARCH models, as well as the 
continuous time term structure models in the Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (HJM, 1992) framework, 
including the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR, 1985) model. We estimate this panel GARCH model 
using the maximum likelihood method and the Marquardt-Levenberg algorithm. We have a panel 
of 19 forward rates of six-month tenor with maturities ranging from six-months to 9.5 years in 
increments of six months each. For each day, we estimate the GARCH model on the history of 
the forward rates available up to that day. We impose a minimum requirement of 66 days of data 
(about three months) which gives us sufficient observations (66 x 19 = 1,254) to estimate this 
panel GARCH model reliably. Based on the estimated model, we forecast the volatilities of all 
the forward rates. Using these forward rate volatility forecasts, we price each caplet individually 
using the Black model, and then invert the resultant at-the-money cap price to obtain the flat 
implied volatility which is then used as the benchmark volatility in the EIV calculation. The panel 
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GARCH model is a sophisticated way of extracting information from historical volatility, which 
we convert into a consistent benchmark through the Black model.16  
In addition to using this panel GARCH model to estimate the benchmark volatility, we employ 
two alternative volatility measures as benchmarks to compute the EIV for additional robustness. 
The first is a simple historical volatility estimated as the annualized standard deviation of changes 
in the log forward rates of different maturities, using the past 66 days of forward rate data (our 
results are again robust to different choices of this historical time window). The second 
alternative volatility measure we use is a comparable implied volatility from the swaption market. 
We use only the at-the-money “diagonal” swaption volatilities since they are the most actively 
traded swaption contracts in the market. For example, for the two-year caps/floors, we use the 
1x1 swaption (one-year option on the one-year forward swap) volatility as the relevant 
benchmark, since the 1x1 swaption price reflects the volatilities of forward rates out to two-years 
in the term structure. Similarly, for the four-year caps/floors, we use the 2x2 swaption volatility 
as the benchmark volatility. For the three-year caps/floors, we use the average of the 1x1 and the 
2x2 swaption volatilities. The other benchmark volatilities are calculated in a similar manner. 
It is important to note that the first two benchmark volatility measures (the panel GARCH based 
volatility and simple standard deviation) are both historical volatility measures. In principle, one 
could forecast the volatility of forward rates over the life of the cap/floor using the panel GARCH 
model. However, interest rate options like caps/floors (unlike most equity options) have very long 
maturities, ranging from two to ten years. In addition, the Euribor data are only available from 
January 1999 onwards (since the introduction of the Euro). Therefore, forecasting the volatilities 
of forward rates two to ten years in the future using the panel GARCH model is likely to be 
unreliable. As a result, we use these two alternative historical volatility measures (panel GARCH 
and standard deviation) as proxies for the expected volatility. The advantage of the panel 
GARCH methodology is that it extends to forward rates a model that has been shown to work 
                                                          
16 We do extensive robustness tests using several alternative specifications of the panel GARCH model 
(including a specification with a parametric volatility hump similar to the one in Fan, Gupta, and Ritchken 
(2006)), to ensure that our results are not driven by any particular choice of a model for the benchmark 
volatility. These results are not presented in the paper to save space, but can be furnished by the authors, 
upon request.. 
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well for forecasting the short rate volatility. The advantage of the historical standard deviation is 
its simplicity and freedom from imposition of any model structure. However, both these 
benchmarks suffer from the fact that they are backward looking whereas option prices are based 
on forward looking volatilities. The volatility from the swaption market provides us with a 
measure of the expected volatility in the underlying Euribor market (which is common to both 
caps/floors as well as swaptions) over the maturity of the cap/floor, but from a different market 
that is not directly influenced by the liquidity effects in the cap/floor markets. These three 
benchmark volatility measures, applied separately, complement each other and provide us with 
confidence about the robustness of our results.  
Figure 1 presents the scatter plots for the EIV across moneyness represented by LMR for our 
three benchmark volatility measures – panel GARCH, standard deviation, and swaption implied 
volatility. The plots are presented for three representative maturities ― two-year, five-year, and 
ten-year ― for the pooled cap and floor data. The plots for the other maturities are similar. These 
plots clearly show that there is a significant smile curve, across strike rates, in these interest rate 
options markets. The smile curve is steeper for short-term options, while for long-term options, it 
is flatter and not symmetric around the at-the-money strike rate. It is also important to note that 
the range of moneyness observed in this market is much greater than that generally observed in 
the equity markets. For example, for two-year caps/floor, it is not uncommon to find options that 
have strike rates that are 40%-50% higher or lower than the at-the-money strike rate. We classify 
the options that have LMRs between -0.1 and 0.1 as being at-the-money, since the volatility smile 
is virtually non-existent within this moneyness range.  
2.2. How are Liquidity and Price Related in the Interest Rate Options Markets? 
As argued in the literature, the relationship between the liquidity of an asset and its price is of 
fundamental importance in any asset market. For common underlying assets like stocks and 
bonds usually more liquid assets will have lower returns and higher prices. However, for 
derivative assets, especially those in zero net supply where it is not clear whether the marginal 
 15 
investor would be long or short, this relationship may go either way. In this subsection, we 
examine this relationship for Euro interest rate caps and floors.  
To gain an initial understanding of this relationship, we first estimate the correlation between the 
EIV and the RelBAS for all maturities for all three of the benchmark volatility measures. For 
example, the correlation between the EIV (based on the panel GARCH model) and the RelBAS is 
about 0.41 for two-year maturity caps/floors, 0.35 for five-year maturity caps/floors, and 0.44 for 
ten-year maturity caps/floors, which are all statistically significantly greater than zero. Figure 2 
presents the sample scatter plots for the two, five, and ten-year maturity options, for all the three 
benchmark volatility measures. The plots for the other maturities are similar. Across all the nine 
maturities, we find that the average of the correlation coefficients (between the EIV and the 
RelBAS) is 0.41 using the panel GARCH based benchmark volatility, 0.44 using the historical 
standard deviation based benchmark volatility, and 0.43 using the swaption based benchmark 
volatility. Although these are just “raw” correlations between option expensiveness and 
illiquidity, they do indicate that, on average, more illiquid options appear to be more expensive 
across all moneyness buckets and maturities.  
Illiquidity, especially for a derivative asset, arises endogenously due to the fundamental frictions 
in financial markets. In particular, the bid-ask spreads capture the slope of the supply curve of the 
dealers, which is affected by hedging costs, extent of unhedgeable risks, and the dealers’ risk 
appetite and capital. Liquidity in a broader sense also captures the ease with which the market-
makers can find an offsetting trade. Even though the dealers may not find offsetting trades for 
their entire inventory, they would still prefer to carry as little inventory as possible. Therefore, 
finding an offsetting trade and hence the liquidity of the options themselves matters to them. To 
the extent that they cannot find an offsetting trade, they would charge a premium to carry that 
inventory. In this manner, liquidity could be both a “cause” and an “effect”. In fact, in the context 
of a dynamic trading model, Gallmeyer, Hollifield, and Seppi (2005) show that, especially for 
long-dated securities, the demand discovery process leads to endogenous joint dynamics in prices 
and liquidity. Thus, both liquidity and price can have an effect on each other, and it is likely that 
they are jointly determined by a set of exogenous macro-financial variables. Therefore, we model 
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this endogenous relationship within a simultaneous equation model of liquidity (relative bid-ask 
spreads) and price (EIV), using macro-financial variables as the exogenous determinants of these 
two endogenous variables.  
2.2.1. Liquidity Effects in ATM Options 
Unlike underlying asset markets, options markets have another dimension (the strike price/rate) 
along which both liquidity and prices change, as shown in the figures above. There is a smile (or 
a skew) across strike rates in both implied volatilities as well as liquidity. These smiles/skews 
arise in part due to the skewness and excess kurtosis in the distribution of the underlying interest 
rates. In order to clearly disentangle liquidity effects from any effects arising due to the volatility 
smiles/skews observed in this market, we first focus only on at-the-money options, with LMRs 
between -0.1 and 0.1. More precisely, these options are near-the-money, instead of being truly at-
the-money. However, as shown in figure 1, the volatility smile is virtually flat within this 
moneyness range, hence the smile effects, if any, are likely to be negligible for these options.17 In 
spite of the smile being virtually flat for these at-the-money options, we control for any residual 
smile effects within this moneyness bucket using an asymmetric quadratic function of LMR that 
best explains the variation in EIV as well as in RelBAS across strikes.18 Therefore, we use LMR, 
LMR2, and (1LMR<0.LMR) as controls for any residual strike rate effects for both liquidity and price 
in the simultaneous equation model.  
Our discussions with market participants revealed that the dealers consider the vega and the 
moneyness of the options while setting bid-ask spreads. As a good approximation, vega can be 
expressed as a quadratic function of the moneyness of the option. Thus, including these LMR 
controls in the RelBAS equation also takes care of the dependence of bid-ask spreads on vega and 
on moneyness. The objective of such LMR controls in both the equations is to filter out any 
residual dependence of EIV and RelBAS on the moneyness of the option, and examine whether 
                                                          
17 In additional tests, we find that our results are robust to narrower (LMRs between -0.05 and 0.05) or 
wider (LMRs between -0.15 and 0.15) LMR ranges for defining options as at-the-money. 
18 This is based on our examination of alternative functional forms using pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regressions of EIV and RelBAS on various functions of LMR, and is consistent with the appearance of the 
plots presented in Figure 1. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these LMR controls for the at-the-
money options. 
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there is still any relationship between these two variables, as well as between these two variables 
and the exogenous variables in the model. 
Therefore, we estimate the following equation system for ATM options with LMRs between -0.1 
and 0.1: 
 
      …..(2) 
 
The two-equation simultaneous-equations model above has two endogenous variables (EIV and 
RelBAS), a vector of LMR controls, and a vector of exogenous variables in both the equations for 
model identification. The intuition behind the choice of the exogenous variables is explained 
below. 
The swaption volatility (SwpnVol) is included to examine whether the price and the liquidity of 
these options vary significantly with the level of uncertainty in the interest rate options markets. 
Although we have already benchmarked the cap/floor implied volatility against various proxies 
for the expected interest rate volatility, we include the swaption volatility as a control to account 
for any residual dependence of the EIV on the level of volatility. During more uncertain times, 
information asymmetry issues, which may influence both price and liquidity, are likely to be 
more important than during periods of lower uncertainty. If there is significantly greater 
information asymmetry, market makers may charge higher than normal prices for options, since 
they may be more averse to taking short positions. This, in turn, will lead to higher excess implied 
volatilities of options. During times of greater uncertainty, a risk-averse market maker may 
demand higher compensation for providing liquidity to the market, which would affect the 
relative bid-ask spreads in the market. The market price of liquidity risk may also be higher 
during more uncertain times. We use the ATM swaption volatility as an explanatory variable 
here, since it is not subject to the liquidity effects in the cap/floor markets. The ATM swaption 
volatility can be interpreted as a general measure of the future interest rate volatility.  
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We considered including other option Greeks as additional controls but did not do so for two 
reasons. First, the squared LMR included above is an approximate proxy for the convexity term. 
Second, introducing other option Greeks explicitly may introduce potential collinearity, since, to 
a first order approximation, these risk parameters can be modeled as linear functions of volatility 
and the square root of the time to expiration.19 
The six-month German Treasury-Euribor Spread (DefSprd) is included as a measure of the 
aggregate default risk of the constituent banks in the Euribor fixing. It controls for any credit risk 
effects in liquidity and price. This is especially important for caps and floors since these are over-
the-counter options not backed by a clearing corporation or an exchange; hence the level of credit 
risk may affect the pricing as well as the liquidity of these options. The default spread is also 
included as another proxy for the level of uncertainty in the market, since it goes up during 
uncertain times. Since model risk is higher when the level of uncertainty is high, it is likely that 
higher default spread regimes are associated with higher option prices as well as wider bid-ask 
spreads.  
In the first equation of the simultaneous equation model, we include the spot six-month Euribor 
(6Mrate) and the slope of the yield curve (Slope, defined as the difference between the five-year 
and six-month spot rates) as instruments for EIV. These variables are used as proxies for the 
expectations of the market about the direction in which interest rates are expected to move in 
future. If interest rates are mean reverting, very low interest rates are likely to be followed by rate 
increases. Similarly, a steeply upward-sloping yield curve signals rate increases. Thus the yield 
curve variables are also likely to capture the demand for these interest rate options. The short rate 
and the slope also proxy for the expectations in the financial markets about future inflation and 
money supply, which are fundamental determinants of the term structure of interest rates and its 
volatility. However, it is unlikely that the yield curve variables have a direct effect on the relative 
bid-ask spreads of these options. Therefore, we use them as instruments for the excess implied 
                                                          
19 See, for example, Brenner and Subrahmanyam (1994), who provide, in the context of the Black-Scholes 
model, approximate values for the risk parameters of options that are close to being at-the-money on a 
forward basis. 
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volatilities. In our econometric tests later in this paper, we examine whether these instruments are 
valid from a statistical standpoint. 
The ATM volatility and term structure variables act as approximate controls for a model of 
interest rates displaying skewness and excess kurtosis.20 Typically, in such models, the future 
distribution of interest rates depends on the current day’s volatility and on the level of interest 
rates. Thus, by including the contemporaneous volatility and interest rate variables in the 
regression, we try to capture the relationship between the excess implied volatilities and liquidity 
without explicitly considering a more detailed structural model for interest rates.  
In the second equation of the simultaneous equations model, we include the logarithm of the 
trading volume of the three-month Euribor futures contract on the London International Financial 
Futures Exchange i.e. LIFFE (LiffeVol) and the spread between the three-month AA financial CP 
rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate (CpTbSprd) as instruments for the relative bid-ask 
spreads in this market. The Euribor futures volume is a proxy for trading activity due to interest 
rate hedging demand. There are no volume data available for caps and floors, since they are 
traded over-the-counter. Most of the trading activity for these options is either by firms 
attempting to hedge their interest rate exposures or from inter-dealer trades. The Euribor futures 
volume variable is likely to be positively correlated with the trading volumes (and liquidity) for 
caps and floors, since, to some extent, they are substitute products for hedging interest rate risk. 
However, there is no reason for the Euribor futures volume to affect the excess implied 
volatilities of these options, except through liquidity effects. Therefore, it is likely to be a valid 
instrument. 
The CP to T-bill spread has been used as an instrument for the variation in aggregate liquidity 
demand in several prior studies, including Krishnamurthy (2002) and Gatev and Strahan (2006). 
Since the CP market is illiquid in comparison with the T-bill market, the spread between the two 
rates reflects aggregate liquidity demand. The largest investors in the CP market are banks and 
money market mutual funds; hence the spread is reflective of the aggregate liquidity demand of 
                                                          
20 Our results for the ATM bucket are robust to the explicit inclusion of the historical skewness and excess 
kurtosis of the interest rate distribution as additional controls in the simultaneous equation model. 
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these institutions. Therefore, this spread is likely to be positively correlated to the bid-ask spreads 
that these institutions charge for making markets in the instruments in which they are active, to 
the extent that macro institution-level liquidity may be correlated with micro contract-level 
liquidity. However, it is unlikely that this spread would affect the excess implied volatilities of 
these options, except through their effect on liquidity. Hence, it is a valid instrument for the 
relative bid-ask spreads. Later, we also examine the statistical validity of both these instruments 
in our econometric tests.  
These macro-financial variables, taken together, incorporate most of the relevant information 
about fundamental economic indicators, such as expected inflation, GDP growth rate, and risk 
premia. The macro-financial variables along with the LIFFE futures volume also control for the 
volatility risk premium in this market. Since the fundamental economic variables are available at 
most monthly, we must rely on daily proxies for the expectations of these economic factors in the 
financial markets.21 
This simultaneous equation model is estimated using three-stage least squares, since the residuals 
in each equation may be correlated with the endogenous variables, and these residuals may also 
be correlated across the two equations. We use instrumental variables to produce consistent 
estimates, and generalized least squares (GLS) to account for the correlation structure of the 
residuals across the two equations. In the first stage, we develop instrumented values for both the 
endogenous variables, using all exogenous variables in the system as instruments. In the second 
stage, based on a two-stage least squares estimation of each equation, we obtain a consistent 
estimate of the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances. Using this covariance matrix of 
residuals from the second stage, and the instrumented values of the endogenous variables from 
the first stage, we then perform a GLS estimation as the third stage of the three-stage least squares 
estimation.  
                                                          
21 We considered other macro-financial variables as well, such as yields on speculative grade long-term 
debt, the short term repo rate as a proxy for money supply, and the volatility and stock returns in European 
equity markets. These variables were eliminated due to collinearity with the variables included in the 
model. 
 21 
The results for this model are presented in Table 3. Our primary inference is regarding the sign of 
the coefficients c2 and d2. Both these coefficients are positive and statistically significant for all 
option maturities. This shows that for ATM options, within the endogenous framework specified 
above, controlling for potential exogenous drivers of price and liquidity in this market, higher 
values of EIV are associated with higher values of RelBAS, and vice-versa. In other words, more 
liquid options are priced lower, while less liquid options are priced higher, after taking into 
account the effects of the macro and control variables. This is an important result, and is quite 
different from the joint behavior of price and liquidity observed in other asset markets, such as 
those for stocks and bonds. For example, in the equity markets, it has been shown that more 
liquid stocks have lower returns (higher prices); what we observe here is the opposite; that is, that 
more liquid options have lower prices. Thus in this market, higher liquidity is actually associated 
with a discount, not a premium. 
The primary explanation for this result is the fundamental difference between derivative assets 
and underlying assets alluded to in the introduction. Derivatives are in zero net supply; therefore, 
it is unclear whether the marginal investor in these assets would be long or short. In addition, the 
long and short positions in derivatives have asymmetric risk exposures (especially for options), 
and present different hedging needs to the counterparties on both sides. As argued by Brenner, 
Eldor and Hauser (2001), for an asset in zero net supply, both the buyer and the seller are 
concerned about illiquidity pushing the prices in the opposite directions. Depending on the risk 
exposure and the hedging needs of each side, either the “buyer-effect” (lower prices for illiquid 
assets) or the “seller-effect” (higher prices for illiquid assets) could dominate. In this market, we 
find that the “seller-effect” dominates and the more illiquid options have higher prices. From our 
discussions with the market participants it is clear that, in general, in this market, the dealers are 
net sellers of these options whereas the corporate entities are the net buyers. On any given day, a 
substantial proportion of the trades in the interest rate options market are sell-side trades where 
banks sell caps and floor to corporate clients.22 The corporate end-users buy these options to 
                                                          
22 An experienced market maker, who was the global head of the interest rate options desk at one of the 
largest banks in the world put the proportion of sell-side trades at between 80% and 90% on any given day. 
Unfortunately, there are  no hard data available to substantiate his estimate. 
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hedge their other interest rate exposures and are usually not concerned about the liquidity of the 
options, since they typically hold these options to maturity. On the other hand, the dealers, who 
are net sellers, are concerned about the liquidity of the options because it captures the effects of 
imperfect hedging, limited risk appetite and capital constraints (Figlewski (1989) and Garleanu, 
Pedersen and Poteshman (2006)).23 Limited risk appetite and capital constraints may be a result of 
the agency considerations between the dealers and their financiers. Imperfect hedging may be due 
to the trading frictions in the underlying asset markets, as well as the presence of risks in options 
that cannot be hedged using the underlying assets (such as unspanned stochastic volatility or 
jumps). There is basis risk between options of different strikes and maturities, which makes it 
impossible to exactly offset a short position in an illiquid option by buying a liquid option at a 
different strike and/or maturity. In such a scenario, when option market-makers sell illiquid 
options, it is difficult for them to find an offsetting trade and earn the bid-ask spread on the option 
right away (which is something traders generally try to do). Furthermore, the dealers are exposed 
to greater model risk, when there is less liquidity in the market, since they have fewer traded 
prices available to reliably calibrate their pricing models. Therefore, they are exposed to 
unhedgeable risks for which they demand compensation by way of higher option prices on more 
illiquid contracts. The resulting increase in the slope of the upward sloping option supply curve 
(Bollen and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2006)) increases the bid-ask 
spreads as well as the option prices, consistent with our findings. Thus, given the structure of this 
particular market, it is not surprising that the “seller-effect” dominates and that the illiquid 
options trade at higher prices. 
We can examine the magnitude of the coefficient c2 to determine the economic significance of 
the responsive of EIV to relative bid-ask spreads. Depending upon maturity, the excess implied 
                                                          
23 Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2006) focus on the effects of changing inventory on the prices of 
derivatives due to the risk aversion of the dealer and imperfect hedging. However, their set-up is also useful 
for examining the relationship between the prices and bid-ask spreads given the level of inventory. 
Changing levels of inventory affect the prices through movement along a given supply curve, whereas the 
relationship between the bid-ask spreads and prices is a result of the changing slope of the supply curve. 
Our empirical analysis examines the latter relationship rather than the former. Our analysis is not meant to 
throw any light on the extent to which the changes in the levels of inventory affect prices, but not bid-ask 
spreads. However, we control for macro-economic variables that capture the changes in the demand for 
these options, and hence the changing levels of dealers’ inventory. 
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volatilities increase by 25 to 70 basis points for every percentage point increase in the relative 
bid-ask spreads of these options. Alternatively, we can estimate the absolute price impact of a one 
standard deviation change in the relative bid-ask spread of an option. For example, the standard 
deviation of the relative bid-ask spreads of five-year caps and floors is about 2.3%. Therefore, a 
one standard deviation shock to the liquidity of the ATM five-year caps and floors would 
translate into a 115 basis point increase in their excess implied volatility, given a c2 coefficient of 
0.50.  For representative interest rates and ATM volatility, this is equivalent to an increase of 
about 5% in the absolute price (the price in Euros)  of the five-year ATM cap/floor.  In general, 
for other maturities, a one standard deviation shock to the liquidity of a cap/floor translates into 
an absolute price change of between 4% and 8%, which is an economically significant magnitude.   
In addition, we see that the coefficients c2 and d2 are generally increasing in the maturity of these 
options. This indicates that the longer maturity options exhibit a stronger liquidity effect, perhaps 
to compensate the seller for the illiquidity over a longer time frame. This is consistent with the 
effect reported by Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2005) in the U.S. Treasury securities market, 
where the average liquidity over the asset’s remaining life is found to affect yields, since the 
expected trading costs to the marginal investor vary with the remaining life of the security. 
Similar results are reported by Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2006) for the U.S. corporate bond 
market; they estimate that a one standard deviation improvement in liquidity leads to a 8-11 basis 
points reduction in the non-default component of the yield spread. These results shed some light 
on the term structure dimension of liquidity effects in this market.  
The coefficients of the exogenous variables in the two equations provide important information 
about the common determinants of price and liquidity in this market. Higher spot rates are 
generally associated with higher excess implied volatility, implying that when there are inflation 
concerns and expectations of rising interest rates, the dealers charge even higher prices (and 
wider bid-ask spreads) for selling these options. Note that these options are all nearly ATM, 
therefore they are not confounded by any smile effects that may be observed in this market. Once 
the effects of the spot rate are accounted for, the slope of the yield curve has a less significant 
effect on the EIV. The impact of increasing interest rate uncertainty is similar ― when swaption 
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volatilities are higher, the excess implied volatilities are also higher. When there is more 
uncertainty in fixed income markets, dealers appear to charge even higher prices (and wider bid-
ask spreads) for these options. This increase in uncertainty worsens the basis risk and the model 
risk that dealers face, which in turn adversely affects liquidity, thereby increasing the slope of 
their supply curve, leading to higher prices and wider bid-ask spreads. Aggregate credit risk 
concerns, proxied by the default spread, do not appear to be significantly related to either price or 
liquidity in this market, except for longer maturity options. The futures volume on LIFFE is 
negatively related to the relative bid-ask spreads on caps and floors, indicating that the demand 
for hedging interest rate risk is one of the determinants of liquidity in the interest rate options 
markets. The CP/T-bill spread appears to be weakly related to the bid-ask spreads, since it is 
statistically significant at the 5% level only for some of the maturities. Aggregate liquidity shocks 
to financial institutions might play some role in affecting the liquidity of interest rate options, but 
their role is not very significant, perhaps because the interest rate options business is not a 
significant proportion of their overall operations. 
We use the single equation version of the Hausman test to examine whether the variables 
assumed to be exogenous in the system are, in fact, uncorrelated with the structural disturbances. 
We examine the issue for each equation, for each of the exogenous variables. For each exogenous 
variable individually, we adopt the following procedure. First, we estimate the parameters of the 
equation using two-stage least squares, treating the variable in question as an exogenous variable. 
Then we compute an instrumental variables estimate of the same parameters, where the 
instrumented values of the endogenous variables are estimated using the remaining exogenous 
variables, excluding the exogenous variable being examined. A Wald test based on the difference 
of these two estimators examines the null hypothesis that the variable in question is indeed 
exogenous. In addition, we compute a system-wide statistic for model specification based on the 
specification test in Greene (2000). This is a likelihood ratio test based on the residuals with 
respect to the exogenous variables computed using three-stage least squares (a full information 
estimator) versus those computed using OLS. If the likelihood ratio statistic is below the chi-
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square critical value (with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying 
restrictions), the model specification is not rejected. 
The diagnostic tests for the validity of our model show that our overall model specification 
cannot be rejected. The system-wide likelihood ratio statistic is 1.44, much below the critical 
value at the 5% level of 5.99. In addition, the Hausman tests for each exogenous variable result in 
chi-square statistics well below the critical value at the 5% level of 3.84. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the variables assumed to be exogenous are indeed exogenous within 
the system. These tests give us confidence that our instruments are valid within the overall 
specification of the simultaneous equation model. 
The results so far use the mid prices of ATM options to estimate their EIV. Therefore, positive 
values of c2 and d2 imply that wider bid-ask spreads are associated with higher mid prices, 
controlling for other factors. However, in response to lower liquidity, do the dealers just increase 
their ask prices, keeping their bid prices the same (which would still result in higher mid prices)? 
Or is there any effect of illiquidity on the bid prices of these options as well? In order to 
understand this relationship between liquidity and option prices further, we re-estimate the 
simultaneous equation model separately using EIV computed from ask and bid prices. The results 
from this analysis are presented in Table 4; to conserve space, we only report the coefficients of 
c2 and d2. (The size and significance of the other coefficients as well as the R2 of the regressions 
are similar to those in Table 3.). On the ask side, the coefficients are positive and significant for 
all option maturities, indicating that the ask prices are definitely higher in states of the world 
where the bid-ask spreads are wider. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the dealers charge 
higher prices for selling these options, when they are more illiquid. The results on the bid side are 
actually more interesting ― the coefficients are positive for almost all maturities, but significant 
at the 5% level only for the longer maturity caps and floors. This shows that when there is less 
liquidity, the dealers are also willing to pay more for buying some of the caps/floors, especially 
the longer maturity options. This is consistent with the explanation that some part of the risk of 
options is unhedgeable, and hence the dealers are less willing to hold net short positions, 
especially in the longer maturity options. When there is less liquidity, the dealers are also willing 
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to pay more to find a counterparty to reverse their sell-side trades than they are when there is 
more liquidity. Of course, since the dealers are net short in the aggregate, not all of them are able 
to reverse their sell-side trades. 
For robustness, we re-estimate the simultaneous equation model for ATM options using the two 
alternative benchmark volatility measures – the historical standard deviation of log changes in 
forward rates, as well as the relevant implied volatility from the swaptions market. The excess 
implied volatilities are calculated in a similar manner, as the difference between the implied 
volatility of the cap/floor and the benchmark volatility. The results from these tests are presented 
in Table 5. In the interest of brevity, we only present the coefficients of interest, c2 and d2, since 
the other coefficients are of similar sign and significance as before. We again find that across all 
maturities, the coefficients of EIV and RelBAS are positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that these ATM options become more expensive when their liquidity reduces, and vice-versa.24  
2.2.2. Liquidity Effects in Options Across Strikes 
In this sub-section, we expand our analysis to options across all strikes. In order to properly 
control for smile effects, we introduce the skewness and excess kurtosis of the underlying interest 
rate distribution, interacted with LMR, in the simultaneous equation model as additional controls 
for the time-varying patterns of volatility smiles in these markets. Skewness and excess kurtosis 
are estimated on a rolling basis using the historical forward rates data from the most recent 66 
days. Much of the volatility smile in options arises as a result of stochastic volatility, jumps in 
interest rates or both, which manifest themselves in the interest rate distribution as skewness and 
excess kurtosis. Therefore, controlling for the skewness and excess kurtosis at least partially 
controls for the daily variation in the volatility smile arising from stochastic volatility or jumps in 
interest rate. As before, we also have the asymmetric quadratic functional form of LMR as a 
control for the general shape of the volatility smile observed in these markets. Therefore, the 
model we estimate is as follows: 
                                                          
24 We did several further robustness checks on our results, by re-estimating these models for bid and ask 
prices separately, as well as by using different historical time windows for calculating the standard 
deviation based reference volatility. These results were similar, and are not reported in the paper, but are 
available directly from the authors. 
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......(3) 
 
The skewness is interacted with LMR, as the effect of skewness on the smile is likely to be 
asymmetric and dependent on the moneyness of the option. Excess kurtosis is interacted with 
absolute LMR, as the effect of kurtosis on the smile is likely to be symmetric and higher for 
away-from-the-money options. We estimate this model for bid, mid, and ask prices, for our 
primary measure of option expensiveness that uses the panel GARCH based volatility as the 
benchmark. The results for this analysis are presented in Table 6. Again, to conserve space, we 
again present only the coefficients of interest, c2 and d2, since the size and significance of the 
coefficients as well as the R2 are similar to those in Table 3. We find that, across all maturities, 
more illiquid options are more expensive. They have significantly higher mid and ask prices, 
while the results for bid prices are somewhat weak for the shorter maturity caps/floors. It is 
important to note that the liquidity effects that we observe in this sub-section are incremental to 
the general volatility smile that is observed in this market, controlling for the daily changes in the 
skewness and excess kurtosis in the underlying interest rate distribution, thereby controlling for at 
least some of the effects of stochastic volatility and jumps in interest rates. In addition, since these 
effects are also present in the bid prices of these options, at least for the longer maturity 
caps/floors, it is unlikely that they arise only due to an increase in the ask prices.  
As a further robustness check for the liquidity effects across strikes, we re-estimate the 
simultaneous equation model in equation (3) using the historical standard deviation and swaption 
implied volatilities as benchmark. These results, presented in Table 7, confirm our results for 
ATM options that more illiquid options are more expensive, controlling for other effects, 
regardless of the benchmark volatility used for estimating the excess implied volatilities.  
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2.3. The Relationship between Changes in Liquidity and Prices 
To analyze the relationship between price and liquidity further, we re-estimate the simultaneous 
equation model using first differences for at-the-money options. If liquidity affects asset prices, 
then changes in liquidity should also change asset prices (Amihud, Mendelsen, and Wood 
(1990)). In Table 8, we present the results of the simultaneous equation model, where daily 
changes in EIV and RelBAS are regressed on each other as well as on changes in LMR functions 
and macro-financial variables, as follows: 
 
......(4) 
 
This model explicitly tests for the relationship between daily changes in the price and the 
liquidity of options, as opposed to the relationship between the levels of these variables examined 
earlier. As before, we estimate this model for ATM options separately for each option maturity. 
The results in Table 8 are similar to the ones reported in Table 3, although these models have 
lower explanatory power, which is not surprising since they are estimated based on daily changes. 
The daily change in EIV is positively associated with the daily change in RelBAS, controlling for 
changes in option-specific and macro-financial variables. In addition, we find that positive shocks 
to the changes in uncertainty in the fixed income markets are associated with positive shocks to 
changes in both price and liquidity of these interest rate options, although these effects are weaker 
than those observed in the simultaneous equation model, in levels, estimated in the previous 
subsection. One of the reasons why these effects are weaker could be the nature of the 
relationship between shocks to liquidity/price and the shocks to these macro-financial variables: 
If the relationship between them is not contemporaneous, and one affects the other with a lag, we 
may not observe strong significance in the contemporaneous models estimated above. We deal 
with the issue of lagged responses in the next section. The overall model specification and 
Hausman tests again confirm that our instruments are valid. In addition, consistent with our 
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findings in the previous section, we find stronger effects on the ask side than on the bid side, 
though the coefficients c2 and d2 are positive in both cases. We also obtain similar results when 
we repeat the tests for options across all strike rates, and when we use the other measures of EIV, 
calculated using the alternative benchmark volatilities. 
The analysis above helps us understand the joint determinants of price and liquidity in this 
market. However, as the results indicate, there is a term structure element to the liquidity effects 
in this market; that is, the variation in liquidity is not the same for all maturities. In addition, there 
are strike rate effects that we have controlled for. Therefore, the natural question is to what extent 
this liquidity is driven by common factors across different strikes and maturities. In the next 
section, we explore these common drivers of liquidity in the interest rate options markets.  
3. Are There Common Drivers of Liquidity in the Interest Rate Options 
Market? 
We first examine the time-variation in liquidity for caps/floors. Figure 3 presents the time-series 
plots of the relative bid-ask spreads for each maturity by moneyness. The out-of-the-money 
bucket contains caps with LMRs less than -0.1 and floors with LMRs greater than 0.1. Similarly, 
the in-the-money bucket contains caps with LMRs greater than 0.1 and floors with LMRs less 
than -0.1. The at-the-money bucket contains caps and floors with LMRs between -0.1 and 0.1. 
For each day and each maturity, the relative bid-ask spreads within each bucket are averaged and 
then plotted over time. Each plot presents the time-series of the relative bid-ask spreads for the 
nine option maturities separately for the three moneyness groups. These plots clearly indicate that 
there is significant time-variation in relative bid-ask spreads, across maturity and moneyness. In 
addition, within each moneyness group, there appear to be both systematic and unsystematic 
components (across maturities) to the time variations in the relative bid-ask spreads. Indeed, the 
extent of commonality in the time-variations in bid-ask spreads in this market is one of the 
primary questions we investigate in this section.  
Next, we examine the average correlations between relative bid-ask spreads across different 
moneyness groups. Within each moneyness group, we have nine maturities. For each maturity, 
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we have a time-series of relative bid-ask spreads. We compute the correlation between the 
relative bid-ask spreads across different maturities, within each moneyness group. We average 
these correlations within the moneyness groups ― these are reported as the diagonal elements in 
Table 9. For example, the OTM/OTM value of 0.68 is the average correlation between the 
relative bid-ask spreads for nine maturities for OTM options (so it is an average of (9 x 8)/2; that 
is, 36 correlations). This indicates that the average correlation between relative bid-ask spreads 
within OTM options, across all maturities, is 0.68. In addition to the average correlations within 
each moneyness group, we also estimate the average correlations across the moneyness groups. 
For example, the OTM/ITM value of 0.24 is the average correlation between relative bid-ask 
spreads for each maturity for the OTM options with those for each maturity for the ITM options 
(there are 9 x 9, or 81, correlations). This indicates that the average correlation between the OTM 
and the ITM option relative bid-ask spreads, across all maturities, is 0.24. These correlations 
indicate some interesting patterns. First, the relative bid-ask spreads appear to be fairly highly 
correlated across maturities within each moneyness group, although this correlation is a bit lower 
for OTM options. Second, the correlations across moneyness groups is considerably lower, 
especially between OTM options and either ATM or ITM options. It appears that there is 
significant movement in the relative bid-ask spreads, across maturities and strikes, but the OTM 
options seem to vary a bit differently from the ATM and the ITM options. The time-series plots 
of relative bid-ask spreads presented in Figure 3 indicate similar patterns. 
These correlations and time-series plots indicate that some part of the variation in the relative bid-
ask spreads appears to be systematic. From a market-wide perspective, it is important to 
understand if there is any systematic component to the liquidity shocks that has an impact on this 
market. This issue has strong implications for the pricing of liquidity risk in this market, as well 
as for hedging aggregate liquidity risk in interest rate options. If the liquidity shocks to this 
market are entirely unsystematic, then they do not create significant liquidity risk concerns, since 
they can be diversified away in a portfolio of options. However, if there is a systematic 
component to these liquidity shocks, then there may be liquidity risk concerns in this market, 
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especially during periods of market stress.25 The structure of such systematic liquidity shocks, and 
their macro-economic interpretation, can provide important inputs for designing strategies to 
hedge aggregate liquidity risk in this market.  
3.1. Extracting the Common Liquidity Factor 
We use a panel regression framework to examine whether the time-series variation in the liquidity 
of individual options has any systematic market-wide component, after controlling for the 
changes in option-specific parameters. We divide our options into 27 panels (nine maturities each 
for the three moneyness groups – OTM, ATM, and ITM), and estimate the following regression 
model on daily changes:26 
..(5) 
We include fixed effects for each panel to account for any panel-specific effects that may not be 
captured by the specification above. The intuition behind this regression is to examine the 
changes in liquidity, and remove the part of those changes that can be explained by changes in 
option-specific variables, such as option expensiveness (EIV) and functions of LMR. Although 
the panels are formed based on the three categories for moneyness, we still include the functions 
of LMR as controls, because even within a moneyness bucket, the LMR of an option can change 
every day. Hence, we must account for the part of the change in RelBAS that is due to changes in 
the LMR. In addition, including the change in EIV enables us to take into account the change in 
any other option-specific information as well as the option-specific impact of changes in any 
market variable. 
We estimate this panel regression model using the Prais-Winsten Full FGLS estimator. The 
disturbances in this model are assumed to be heteroskedastic and potentially correlated across the 
27 panels. In addition, we allow for first-order autocorrelation in the disturbances, within each 
                                                          
25 This issue has been explored in the context of the equity markets by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and with regard to the bond markets by Longstaff (2004) and Longstaff et al. 
(2005). 
26 In the equity option markets, Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) show that the bid-ask spreads are related to 
option “Greeks.” As explained earlier, our asymmetric quadratic function of LMR acts as an approximate 
control for these Greeks, in addition to controlling for the shape of the volatility smile.  
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panel, with the coefficient of the AR(1) process allowed to be different for each panel. Therefore, 
the standard errors are robust for the error structure specified in the model, and the parameter 
estimates are conditional on the estimates of the disturbance covariance matrix and on the 
autocorrelation parameters estimated for each panel. For robustness, we estimate this panel 
regression using alternative error structures and estimation procedures (including maximum 
likelihood), and find similar results. 
The results for this panel regression are presented in Table 10. Consistent with our results in the 
previous section, positive changes in excess implied volatilities are associated with positive 
changes in the relative bid-ask spreads, suggesting that improvements in liquidity are associated 
with a decrease in option expensiveness in this market, controlling for strike rate effects. Since 
this regression is estimated as a panel over our entire data set, we have a very large number of 
observations. Across all of these 44,070 observations, we are trying to explain the changes in 
liquidity in terms of changes in option expensiveness and changes in LMR controls, using only 
five parameters. The model is statistically significant and explains about 9% of the variation in 
liquidity changes. Therefore, even though some part of the liquidity changes are statistically 
significantly associated with changes in option-specific parameters, it appears that a large part of 
the change in liquidity may have systematic components.  
If there are no systematic components in the changes in liquidity in this market, then we should 
not see any structure in the residuals obtained from this regression. Any structure in these 
residuals would indicate a missing common systematic factor that affects liquidity changes. 
Therefore, we examine the principal components of the correlation matrix of these residuals 
across the panels. We use the correlation matrix, since principal components are sensitive to the 
units in which the underlying variables are measured. Using the correlation matrix instead of the 
covariance matrix avoids this potential error. 
Since we have 27 panels, we obtain a 27 x 27 correlation matrix, which provides us with 27 
principal components, each one of length 27. If the residuals were perfectly correlated, the first 
eigenvalue would be 27, and a single factor would explain all the variation. If the residuals were 
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uncorrelated, all 27 eigenvalues would be 1. The results of this principal components analysis are 
presented in Table 11. The first eigenvalue is 9.04, which implies that about 33% (9.04/27) of the 
variation in these residuals can be explained by the first common factor. This is statistically 
significant, and indicates that about one-third of the variation in residual changes in liquidity (not 
explained by the changes in option-specific variables) is accounted for by the first common 
factor. This strongly suggests that there is a market-wide systematic component to the liquidity 
shocks that affect these options. The second principal component explains an additional 11% of 
the variation. The third and subsequent principal components are statistically insignificant.  
The structure of these principal components (eigenvectors) reveals the impact of the market wide 
liquidity shock on options of different maturity and moneyness. The first principal component is a 
parallel shock across all maturities and moneyness, indicating that a market wide liquidity shock 
increases the bid-ask spreads of options of all maturity and moneyness. However, the loadings are 
higher in magnitude for the OTM and the ATM options as compared to the ITM options. This 
indicates that the most common liquidity shock, that occurs about one-third of the times, widens 
the bid-ask spreads of primarily the OTM and the ATM options, and has less effect on ITM 
options.  
The second principal component has a negative weight on all the OTM options, and a positive 
weight on the ATM and the ITM options. Further, the weight on the ITM options is greater than 
that on the ATM options. Within each moneyness bucket, the weights across maturities are 
relatively constant. Therefore, the second-order market-wide liquidity shock, which occurs about 
one-tenth of the time, is opposite in structure to the primary liquidity shock. In particular, the 
effect of this second liquidity shock is to widen the bid-ask spreads for the ATM and the ITM 
options, while at the same time narrowing the bid-ask spreads for the OTM options. This may 
indicate a substitution effect, where the market, when hit by an adverse second-order common 
liquidity shock, appears to drive liquidity away from the ATM and the ITM options to the OTM 
options. Since the OTM options are much cheaper than the ATM and ITM options, this finding is 
intuitive ― adverse common liquidity shocks do not just cause the liquidity of these options to 
dry up across the board. In addition, they partly shift the liquidity from expensive to cheaper 
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options. The loading on the ITM options is even higher than that on the ATM options, which 
supports this explanation, since it implies that the reduction in liquidity is greater among the ITM 
options than among the ATM options. The third and subsequent eigenvectors have no significant 
structure.  
3.2. Macro-economic Drivers of the Systematic Liquidity Shocks 
Our results, so far, indicate the presence of a significant common factor that drives liquidity 
changes in interest rate options across strikes and maturities. In this section, we explore the 
fundamental drivers of this systematic liquidity factor. If changes in macro-economic variables 
can be linked with contemporaneous or future changes in the systematic liquidity factor, this 
would have important implications for the measurement of liquidity risk in this market, as well as 
for hedging aggregate liquidity risk in a portfolio of interest rate options.  
Our results in the previous section indicate that changes in the uncertainty in fixed income 
markets are associated with changes in liquidity for options, across strike rates, for all maturities. 
In this section, we use this variable along with other macro-financial variables that capture yield 
curve, default risk and equity market uncertainty to examine how much of the systematic liquidity 
factor they can explain.  
We first construct a daily systematic liquidity factor based on the analysis of the residuals in the 
previous sub-section. We use only the first principal component, which explains 33% of the 
residual variation in the relative bid-ask spreads. Using the first eigenvector as weights, for each 
day, we estimate a weighted-average residual across the 27 maturity-moneyness buckets. This 
gives us a daily time-series of the unexplained first common factor of liquidity changes in this 
market. We regress this factor on contemporaneous and lagged daily changes in the five macro-
financial variables – the short rate, the slope of the term structure, our measure of the swaption 
volatility, the default spread, and our index of Euro zone equity market volatility.  
As discussed earlier, the default spread (DefSprd) captures the credit risk concerns in the 
economy. It may also proxy for overall uncertainty and model risk. We include the 
 35 
contemporaneous and lagged default spreads to examine whether they have any impact on the 
systematic liquidity shock experienced in this market. In the simultaneous equation models in 
section 2.2, the short rate (6Mrate) and the slope (Slope) of the term structure are found to be 
valid instruments for EIV. However, in that model, we use the contemporaneous levels of these 
variables as instruments. In this section, our objective is to understand whether changes in 
fundamental macroeconomic variables drive the systematic liquidity shocks. Therefore, we 
examine whether lagged changes in the short rate and the slope of the term structure have any 
impact on the liquidity factor. For completeness, we also test whether contemporaneous changes 
in these two variables are significant. The short rate and the slope of the term structure are 
financial variables that proxy for expected inflation and money supply. Therefore, it is important 
to test whether the liquidity shocks, especially in the interest rate options markets, are 
fundamentally driven by lagged changes in the expectations about inflation and money supply.  
The volatility of the DAX index (DAXVol) is an indicator of the level of uncertainty in the Euro 
zone equity markets, which could also have an impact on market expectations of future liquidity. 
Since stock prices reflect expectations about future cash flows and discount rates, the average 
volatility in the equity market is also an index of the level of uncertainty in the expectations about 
future cash flows and discount rates. Therefore, we include this variable as a proxy for general 
market uncertainty. In a similar spirit, the swaption volatility (SwpnVol) is included as a proxy for 
uncertainty about future inflation and money supply. We use the Akaike information criterion to 
determine the appropriate number of lags to include in the regression. The results of this 
regression model are presented in Table 12. 
We find that the improvement in the explanatory power of the model is insignificant beyond the 
fourth lag in the macro-financial variables. These macro-financial variables together explain 
about 28% of the unexplained first common liquidity factor in this market. The short rate and the 
slope of the term structure do not appear to have much effect on contemporaneous and future 
values of this factor. This implies that current as well as lagged expectations about inflation, 
money supply, or general business conditions do not appear to have a significant effect on the 
liquidity of the options in this market. This is also consistent with the use of the contemporaneous 
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values of these variables as instruments only for excess implied volatilities and not relative bid-
ask spreads, in the simultaneous equation models in section 2. 
Similarly, an increase in aggregate credit risk concerns in the economy, proxied by the default 
spread variable, does not appear to be related to the systematic liquidity shock that affects the 
fixed income options markets. In the case of option contracts, only the buyer of the option is 
exposed to the credit risk of the seller of the option. Since the interest rate options market studied 
here is an OTC market, the buyers of these caps and floors are exposed to the risk of the dealers 
defaulting. However, there are two primary reasons why these credit risk effects do not appear to 
affect the liquidity in this market. First, most of the dealers in this market are investment grade 
institutions – in fact many of them are high investment grade firms, with very little credit risk.27 
Therefore, cap and floor buyers generally are not unduly concerned about the dealers defaulting 
on these contracts. Second, and more importantly, this is a dealer-driven market where most of 
the trades are in the form of dealers selling caps and floors to corporate clients, with the prices 
being set by the dealers, who have more market power than the typical buyer of these contracts. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the dealers do not care as much about aggregate credit 
risk in the economy, since they are mostly on the sell side! It would be interesting to examine the 
impact of credit risk concerns on the liquidity of options where the buy side is as influential as the 
sell side in setting prices and bid-ask spreads, as would happen for exchange-traded options. 
The uncertainty proxies, both in the fixed income and equity markets, appear to be significant 
drivers of this systematic liquidity shock in fixed income options markets. Lagged changes in the 
DAX index volatility up to three days earlier, and lagged changes in the swaption volatility up to 
four days earlier, are significant in explaining the time variation in the systematic liquidity factor. 
However, for both of these variables, the coefficient on contemporaneous changes is either 
insignificant or weakly significant. The coefficients on lagged changes, with a lag of between one 
and four days, are mostly significant. These results indicate that the traders in fixed income 
options markets appear to use the levels of uncertainty in both the fixed income and equity 
                                                          
27 The institution that supplied our data, WestLB, was an AAA-rated institution during the period of this 
study, since it was de facto guaranteed by the German Treasury.    
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markets to form their own expectations about future liquidity and the liquidity premia. When they 
observe a positive shock to the uncertainty in these markets, they appear to respond by increasing 
the prices of caps and floors, while simultaneously widening the bid-ask spreads that they quote. 
Increased uncertainty makes it more expensive for the dealers to make markets for these options, 
due to an increase in unhedgeable risks as well as greater model risk. Both these factors may 
cause the dealers to increase prices as well as bid-ask spreads. From a timing standpoint, it 
appears that these liquidity effects in the fixed income options markets appear between one and 
four days after the volatility shocks are observed in the fixed income as well as equity markets.  
It is important to note that the results here represent the sensitivity of the systematic component of 
the changes in the bid-ask spreads of these options to the changes in the macroeconomic 
environment, after controlling for the changes in option-specific parameters, which includes the 
changes in the expensiveness of the option. They do not represent the relationship between 
liquidity and aggregate price changes in this market. In addition, the systematic liquidity shock 
that has been extracted from the data is only one of the determinants of the observed bid-ask 
spreads, and accounts for only about one-third of their common variation. The rest of the 
variation is partly due to changes in option-specific parameters, especially moneyness. Therefore, 
these effects constitute only a part of the changes in the bid-ask spread observed in the data. 
As a robustness check, we return to the panel regression model of equation (5), and re-estimate 
the model, after including the contemporaneous value and four lags for each of the five macro-
financial variables. The intuition behind this exercise is to check whether the macro-financial 
variables, identified as being related to the unexplained systematic variation in relative bid-ask 
spreads, do indeed help in explaining the variation in the relative bid-ask spreads of these options 
across strike rates and maturities. We find that this augmented panel regression model explains 
about 16.9% of the variation in the relative bid-ask spreads, up from about 9% that was explained 
only by the changes in option-specific variables. Therefore, introducing contemporaneous and 
lagged changes in these macro-financial variables nearly doubles the explanatory power of the 
panel regression model, which attempts to jointly model the time variation in the relative bid-ask 
spreads across different strike rates and maturities, using over 44,000 observations. Further, the 
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first principal component of the correlation matrix of residuals from this augmented panel 
regression model accounts for about 11.3% of the variation in the residuals. While statistically 
significant, it is much lower than the 33% explained by the first principal component of residuals 
from the panel regression model, without the macro-financial variables. Therefore, adding the 
macro-financial variables explains a large part of the common factor that drives liquidity in this 
market. In fact, the macro-financial variables, especially the volatilities in the equity and fixed 
income markets, remove most of the structure in the part of the variation in liquidity in caps and 
floor unexplained by changes in option-specific variables. The remaining unexplained variation in 
the liquidity of these options is largely unsystematic.  
Our results in this section provide important insights into the fundamental drivers of liquidity in 
this market. It appears that uncertainty about macroeconomic conditions plays a much more 
important role than the direction of the expectations about what may happen in the future, in 
determining the liquidity of caps and floors in the euro interest rate markets. Our results 
complement the findings of Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005), who report that volatility 
shocks are informative in predicting liquidity shifts in the stock and bond markets. However, 
unlike their paper, we do not find any link between proxies for macro liquidity and transaction 
level liquidity. This difference is likely due to the fact that our paper focuses on options that are 
zero net supply assets, unlike stocks and bonds, which are in positive net supply, where macro 
liquidity may play a greater role. 
In addition, our results indicate a certain level of predictability in the systematic liquidity shock 
that affects the fixed income options markets. This has important implications for forecasting the 
liquidity risk in this market, as well as for the hedging of aggregate liquidity risk in portfolios of 
caps and floors. Since the liquidity factor in this market is related to lagged changes in volatilities, 
from a risk measurement perspective, a GARCH-type model could be used for forecasting the 
volatility in the equity and fixed income markets, and the systematic liquidity shock estimated 
based on these volatility shocks. From a risk management perspective, institutions holding 
portfolios of caps and floors could construct macro-hedges against the liquidity risk in these 
options by taking appropriate positions in the volatilities in equity and fixed income markets. For 
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both of these objectives, it is crucial to understand the extent of commonality in liquidity in this 
market, and the primitive structure of this systematic liquidity factor. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The liquidity of an asset has an important influence on its market price. In recent years, this 
influence has been analyzed extensively in the U.S. equity markets, and, to a lesser extent, in the 
U.S. Treasury, corporate bond, and some foreign exchange options markets. Two important facts 
have emerged from these investigations: illiquidity suppresses the price of an asset, resulting in 
higher expected return; and there is a common factor in liquidity across various assets.  
In contrast to this work on the underlying stock and bond markets, there is very little work on the 
influence of liquidity in the derivatives markets, particularly the interest rate derivatives markets. 
This gap is striking for three reasons. First, derivatives markets are an important segment of the 
global financial markets, and thus need to be taken into account in assessing the overall liquidity 
in financial markets. Second, the effect of liquidity on the prices of derivatives is, by no means, 
clear cut. With zero net supply, both the buyers and sellers of derivatives are exposed to its 
illiquidity. In addition, in the case of derivatives, it is not obvious whether the marginal investor 
would be long or short. It would depend on the risk exposures and the hedging needs of either 
side. Thus, the prices of illiquid derivatives could be higher or lower, as compared to the prices of 
derivatives that are more liquid. Third, the interest rate derivatives market is an OTC market, with 
a structure quite different from exchanges, and with contracts that are generally more illiquid 
compared to many exchange traded contracts. Therefore, the inferences drawn from studies on 
the liquidity effects in exchange-traded contracts may not be readily extendable to OTC contracts. 
The liquidity and the price of an asset are fundamentally endogenous variables. Therefore, we 
examine the liquidity effects in the euro interest rate options markets within a simultaneous 
equation model that endogenizes both liquidity and price, thereby modeling liquidity both as a 
cause and an effect. Our results show that more illiquid interest rate options are more expensive, 
controlling for other determinants of liquidity and price. Thus, this result is in sharp contrast to 
earlier findings in the stock and bond markets and in some exchange-traded currency options 
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markets. As our results indicate, the relationship between illiquidity and asset prices cannot be 
generalized based on evidence from just the stock and the bond markets. 
Our second result, on the commonality in liquidity across options, is similar to what has been 
found in other markets. We find that there is a significant common component to the liquidity of 
interest rate options at various strike prices and maturities. We also find that this common 
movement is explained by the shocks to the volatility in the equity and interest rate markets. An 
increase in uncertainty in the equity and interest rate markets appears to cause a negative liquidity 
shock in the interest rate options market. In terms of more primitive macro-economic factors, it is 
not the expectations about inflation or growth that seem to affect the liquidity in interest rate 
options; it is the uncertainty about these expectations that affects the liquidity in this market.  
Our results have important implications for the role of liquidity in the pricing of derivative 
instruments. It would be worthwhile to explore this effect in other derivatives markets and for 
derivative instruments other than options, to see if this influence is similar, especially in different 
market settings. It would also be interesting to focus on crisis periods, such as the aftermath of the 
Russian default in 1998 and the LTCM failure that followed thereafter, to examine the issue of 
liquidity in such an extreme scenario. A related question that has not been explored in the 
literature so far is the interplay between the liquidity effects in the underlying asset market versus 
the market for derivatives. The key question is whether and how the commonality in the liquidity 
factor affects the interactions and the lead-lag relationships between these two markets.  
Another important direction for future research based on our results is the development of models 
where one could include these drivers of liquidity in the pricing kernel itself. Furthermore, since 
interest rate options are much harder to price, with large pricing and hedging errors in general, 
liquidity-adjusted models could provide better pricing and hedging. Given the enormous size of 
this market, there are systemic effects of mispricing and/or inaccurate hedging - understanding 
such liquidity effects can help reduce such systemic risks. We leave these questions for future 
research. 
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Appendix: Implied Volatility in the Black Model for Caps and Floors 
The standard model used for dealer quotations for interest rate caps and floors is the Black (1976) 
model of pricing of options on futures and forward contracts. The model is a variant of the basic 
Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model. Applied to the interest rate option context, the 
model assumes that interest rates are log-normally distributed and relates the price of a European 
call option (C) and a put option (P), at time 0, on an interest rate forward rate agreement (FRA), 
to the underlying variables as follows:28 
[ ]
[ ]
1 2 0,
2 1 0,
2
1
2 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ln 2
t m
t m
C fN d kN d m B
P kN d fN d m B
f t
kd
t
d d t
σ
σ
σ
+
+
= − × ×
= − − − − × ×
+=
= −
    (A.1) 
where 
f = forward interest rate for the period t to t+m, 
σ = annualized volatility of the forward interest rate t on the maturity date, 
m = maturity period of the underlying loan, 
t = maturity date of the option, 
k =  strike rate of the option, and  
B0,t+m= the zero bond price at time 0, for the bond maturing at date t+m. 
Of course, the key variable in the above equations, which is not observable, but about which 
market participants may have differing views, is the volatility. Given all other parameters, a price 
of an option can be inverted to obtain an implied volatility. Thus implied volatility is a 
manifestation of price of the option.  
                                                          
28 This formula is also consistent with the model proposed by Brace, Gatarek and Musiela (1997) [BGM] 
and Miltersen, Sandmann and Sondermann (1997), which is popular among practitioners. BGM derive the 
processes followed by market quoted rates within the HJM framework, and deduce the restrictions 
necessary to ensure that the distribution of market quoted rates of a given tenor under the risk-neutral 
forward measure is log-normal. With these restrictions, caplets of that tenor satisfy the Black (1976) 
formula for options on futures and forward contracts. 
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An interest rate cap (floor) is a collection of caplets (floorlets). A caplet (floorlet), in turn, is a 
single European call (put) option on a reference interest rate, expiring on a specific date. Hence, a 
cap (floor) can be regarded as a portfolio of European call (put) options on interest rates, or 
equivalently, put (call) options on discount bonds. Typically, an interest rate cap is an agreement 
between a cap writer and a buyer (for example, a borrower) to limit the latter’s floating interest 
payments to a specific level for a given period of time. The cap is structured on a specific 
reference rate (usually the three- or the six-month Libor (London Interbank Offer Rate) or 
Euribor (Euro Interbank Offer Rate)) at a predetermined strike level. The reference rate is reset at 
periodic intervals (usually three or six months). In a similar manner, an interest rate floor contract 
sets a minimum interest rate level for a floating rate lender. The cap and floor contracts are 
defined on a pre-specified principal amount.29 
A caplet with maturity ti and strike rate k pays at date ti, an amount based on the difference 
between the rate (ri) at time ti and the strike rate, if this difference is positive, and zero otherwise. 
The amount paid is based on the notional amount and the reset period of the caplet and is paid on 
a discounted basis at time ti. The payoff of this caplet at date ti on a notional principal of €A is:  
⎥⎦
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         (A.2) 
The payoff from a floorlet can be described in a similar manner.  
Since the interest rate over the first period is known, there is no caplet corresponding to the first 
period of the cap. For example, a two-year cap on the six-month Euribor rate, with four 
semiannual periods over its life, would consist of three caplets, the first one expiring in six 
months, and the last one in one year and six months. Thus, the underlying interest rate for the first 
period is the six-month Euribor rate on the date six months from initiating the cap contract. 
Each caplet or floorlet has to be valued separately, using a valuation model such as the Black or 
BGM model in equation (A.1) (the same model that is generally used by the market for quotation 
                                                          
29 Interest rate caps and floors for various maturities and reference rates in all the major currencies are 
traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) markets. The most common reference rate is the three-month Libor 
for USD caps/floors, and the six-month Euribor in the euro markets. 
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purposes), with the price of the cap or floor being the sum of these prices. The volatilities used for 
each caplet or floorlet, which are generally different, across strike rates and maturities, are 
sometimes called spot volatilities. The market quotation for interest rate caps and floors, however, 
is based on the same volatility for all the caplets in a particular cap (or the floorlets in a particular 
floor). In other words, the market price of a cap (or floor) can be derived by plugging in this 
constant volatility for all the component caplets (or floorlets) in the contract. This constant 
volatility is referred to as the flat volatility for the particular cap (or floor) and varies with the 
maturity of the contract. Since caps are portfolios of caplets, the implied flat volatilities of caps 
reflect some average of the implied spot volatilities of individual caplets. In this paper, our 
primary objective is to examine liquidity effects in interest rate options. For doing that, we need 
to focus on traded assets, which are caps and floors. Therefore, we use the flat volatilities of caps 
and floors, since spot volatilities would correspond to caplets and floorlets, which are untraded 
assets. 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Cap and Floor Prices 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on euro (€) interest rate cap and floor prices, across maturities and strike 
rates, over the sample period from January 1999 to May 2001. The caps and floors are grouped together by 
moneyness into five categories. The moneyness for these options is expressed in terms of the Log Moneyness Ratio 
(LMR), defined as the log of the ratio of the par swap rate to the strike rate of the cap/floor. All prices are averages, 
reported in basis points, with the standard deviations of these prices in parenthesis.  
 
 
Maturity  
   
Caps 
      
Floors 
  
            
 Deep 
OTM 
OTM ATM ITM Deep 
ITM 
 Deep 
ITM 
ITM ATM OTM Deep 
OTM 
 LMR 
< -0.3 
-0.3 < 
LMR 
< -0.1 
-0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.1 
0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.3 
LMR 
> 0.3 
 LMR 
< -0.3 
-0.3 < 
LMR 
< -0.1 
-0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.1 
0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.3 
LMR 
> 0.3 
            
2-year 2.1 11.1 43.2  107.7 250.5  250.5 153.7 55.5 13.6 3.6 
 (0.5)   (5.8) (19.8)  (30.9)   (58.8)   (48.1)  (50.7)  (25.4)  (7.9 ) (2.0) 
            
3-year 10.7  37.7  91.9  209.6 481.3   529.1  285.3  111.3  32.7  6.9  
 (10.0)  (20.0)  (33.8)  (52.3)  (133.4)  (114.2)  (74.7)  (44.6)  (18.0)  (4.6) 
4-year 22.3  72.6  152.7 311.3  674.4   728.3  406.4  176.1  62.1  12.0  
  (12.5) (32.2)  (49.7)  (78.3)  (193.1)  (138.7)  (98.9)  (64.8)  (27.8)  (7.9) 
5-year 42.7  119.4  221.7  409.1  872.3   910.8  519.5  244.7  94.3  19.2  
 (16.3) (48.6)  (67.2)  (95.4)  (252.2)  (161.2)  (122.5)  (84.5)  (35.2)  (13.9) 
6-year 66.9  163.7 286.6  507.9  1,006.6  1,093.1  663.8  323.7  128.6  27.2  
 (20.2)  (64.4)  (84.6)  (109.5)  (257.4)  (173.2)  (133.1)  (101.9)  (43.5)  (18.7) 
7-year 93.7 210.9  355.8  610.8  1206.4  1,239.0  809.3  393.3  164.1  36.9  
 (25.4)  (82.2)  (99.3)  (125.3)  (275.5)  (147.0)  (127.5)  (115.2)  (51.9)  (33.0) 
8-year 123.9  264.2  433.2  706.8  1,248.2  1,284.7  924.7  425.2  199.2  46.8  
 (31.4)  (98.1)  (115.9)  (162.8)  (253.4)  (120.8)  (139.3)  (108.3)  (59.6)  (32.8) 
9-year  152.1  309.6  509.9  811.8  1,310.3  NA     997.1  482.3  235.0  58.9  
  (35.6)  (103.2)  (128.7)  (172.2)  (205.3)       (150.2)  (120.9)  (69.6)  (41.5) 
10-year  179.6  347.8  598.0  881.3  1,493.4  NA 815.5  541.7 242.9  71.3  
 (39.8) (106.7)  (140.0)  (153.4)  (275.3)       (31.1) (139.6)  (61.9) (50.1) 
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Table 2 
 
Relative Bid-Ask Spreads for Caps and Floors 
 
This table presents summary statistics on the bid-ask spreads for euro (€) interest rate caps and floors, scaled by the 
average of the bid and ask prices for the options, across strike rates, for different maturities, expressed as 
percentages. The statistics are presented for the sample period from January 1999 to May 2001. The caps and floors 
are grouped together by moneyness into five categories. The moneyness for these options is expressed in terms of 
the Log Moneyness Ratio (LMR), defined as the log of the ratio of the par swap rate to the strike rate of the 
cap/floor. All the spreads are averages, with the standard deviations of the relative spreads in parentheses.  
 
 
Maturity 
   
Caps 
      
Floors 
  
            
 Deep 
OTM 
OTM ATM ITM Deep 
ITM 
 Deep 
ITM 
ITM ATM OTM Deep 
OTM 
 LMR 
< -0.3 
-0.3 < 
LMR 
< -0.1 
-0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.1 
0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.3 
LMR 
> 0.3 
 LMR 
< -0.3 
-0.3 < 
LMR 
< -0.1 
-0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.1 
0.1 < 
LMR 
< 0.3 
LMR 
> 0.3 
            
2-year 80.9% 32.4% 14.7% 7.1% 3.8%  2.5% 4.5% 13.3% 30.8% 77.2% 
 (21.2%) (14.3%) (4.8%) (2.4%) (0.5%)  (1.3%) (1.3%) (7.9%) (11.7%) (24.1%) 
3-year 44.2% 19.0% 11.4% 7.0% 3.8%  2.9% 4.7% 11.2% 31.6% 72.0% 
 (22.9%) (5.7%) (3.2%) (2.5%) (0.6%)  (1.1%) (1.1%) (6.1%) (18.1%) (25.2%) 
4-year 26.1% 14.4% 9.1% 6.2% 4.1%  2.9% 4.5% 8.4% 22.2% 59.9% 
 (9.4%) (4.7%) (2.5%) (2.2%) (1.0%)  (1.0%) (1.0%) (2.5%) (14.5%) (28.7%) 
5-year 20.0% 12.6% 8.6% 6.1% 4.1%  3.1% 4.7% 8.2% 19.8% 59.5% 
 (5.5%) (3.9%) (2.3%) (2.1%) (0.9%)  (1.0%) (1.1%) (2.3%) (13.2%) (27.4%) 
6-year 18.3% 12.1% 8.5% 5.7% 4.1%  3.3% 4.7% 7.9% 15.8% 50.2% 
 (4.8%) (3.6%) (2.2%) (1.4%) (0.9%)  (0.9%) (1.2%) (2.0%) (7.5%) (24.6%) 
7-year 17.6% 11.5% 8.4% 5.5% 4.1%  3.4% 4.6% 7.8% 14.0% 45.3% 
 (4.4%) (3.4%) (2.1%) (1.3%) (3.9%)  (0.9%) (1.1%) (1.9%) (5.0%) (24.6%) 
8-year 17.1% 11.1% 8.3% 5.6% 4.0%  3.2% 4.5% 8.1% 14.0% 42.3% 
 (3.8%) (3.3%) (2.0%) (1.1%) (0.3%)  (1.0%) (1.1%) (2.0%) (5.1%) (21.9%) 
9-year 17.1% 11.0% 8.3% 6.0% 4.2%  NA 4.8% 8.3% 14.0% 40.0% 
 (3.4%) (3.1%) (1.9%) (0.7%) (0.3%)   (1.0%) (2.0%) (5.2%) (20.8%) 
10-year 17.1% 11.2% 7.9% 6.2% 4.1%  NA 4.7% 8.1% 14.9% 38.6% 
 (2.9%) (3.0%) (1.8%) (0.6%) (0.3%)   (1.2%) (2.2%) (5.5%) (20.6%) 
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 Table 3 
 
Determinants of Excess Implied Volatility and Bid-Ask Spreads in ATM Caps and Floors 
 
This table presents the results for a simultaneous equation model, for near-the-money options with LMRs between -
0.1 and 0.1, where the excess implied volatility of euro (€) interest rate caps/floors and relative bid-ask spreads are 
determined endogenously as a function of each other and of other exogenous variables, for the sample period from 
April 1999 to May 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIV is the excess implied volatility of the mid-price of the cap/floor relative to the benchmark volatility estimated 
using a panel GARCH model on historical interest rates. RelBAS is the bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-price. 
LMR is the logarithm of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of the option. 6Mrate is the six-month Euribor 
rate. Slope is the difference between the five-year and six-month Euribor rates. SwpnVol is the implied volatility of 
at-the-money swaption of comparable maturity. DefSprd is the difference between the six-month Euribor and the 
six-month Treasury rate. LiffeVol is the logarithm of the trading volume of three-month Euribor futures on the 
LIFFE. CpTbSprd is the spread between the three-month AA Financial Commercial Paper rate and the three-month 
T-bill rate. Only the coefficients of interest are presented in this table. 
 
 Panel A: EIV as the dependent variable  
 
Maturity c2 c6 c7 c8 
 
c9 Obs R2 
2-year 0.24** 0.43** 0.00 1.45* 1.96 1100 0.19 
3-year 0.28** 0.58** 0.00 0.54* 1.34** 1392 0.22 
4-year 0.52** 1.28** 0.04 0.87** 0.48* 1448 0.24 
5-year 0.50** 0.52** 0.08 0.35** 0.01 1430 0.21 
6-year 0.69** 0.73** 0.12 0.75** 0.68* 1468 0.38 
7-year 0.71** 0.93* 0.22* 0.90** -1.12 1386 0.26 
8-year 0.78** 0.91** 0.18* 0.86** 0.11 1237 0.22 
9-year 0.48** 0.81* 0.25* 0.84* 0.07 1202 0.31 
10-year 0.71** 0.43** 0.56* 0.10* 0.14 887 0.31 
        
 
Panel B: RelBAS as the dependent variable 
 
Maturity d2 d6 d7 d8 
 
d9 Obs R2 
2-year 0.50** 0.46* 0.00 -0.03* 0.25 1100 0.26 
3-year 1.43** 0.89** 0.00 -0.02** 0.19** 1392 0.17 
4-year 1.24** 0.60** 0.03 -0.10** 0.31* 1448 0.22 
5-year 1.19** 0.63** 0.06* -0.20** 0.44** 1430 0.32 
6-year 1.32** 0.68** 0.13** -0.42** 0.71** 1468 0.32 
7-year 1.38** 0.62** 0.04* -0.27** 0.64* 1386 0.32 
8-year 1.29** 0.65** 0.34** -0.60** 0.76* 1237 0.32 
9-year 1.41** 0.45** 0.37** -0.86** 0.66** 1202 0.42 
10-year 1.46** 0.32** 0.64** -0.90** 0.51** 887 0.42 
        
 
** implies significance at the 5% level; * implies significance at the 10% level.  
( )
( )
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LMRdLMRdLMRdEIVddRelBAS
SlopecMratecDefSprdcSwpnVolc
LMRcLMRcLMRcRelBASccEIV
LMR
LMR
*9*8*76                  
.1*5*4*3*21
*96*8*76                    
.1*5*4*3*21
0
2
0
2
+++
+++++=
+++
+++++=
<
<
 50 
Table 4 
 
Bid and Ask Side Determinants of Liquidity and Price (ATM) 
 
This table presents the results for a simultaneous equation model, for near-the-money options with LMRs between -
0.1 and 0.1, estimated separately using bid and ask prices, where the excess implied volatility of euro (€) interest 
rate caps and floors and the relative bid-ask spreads are determined endogenously as a function of each other, and 
other exogenous variables, for the sample period from April 1999 to May 2001: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIV is the excess implied volatility of the bid or the ask price of the cap/floor relative to the benchmark volatility 
estimated using a panel GARCH model on historical interest rates. RelBAS is the bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-
price. LMR is the logarithm of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of the option. 6Mrate is the six-month 
Euribor rate. Slope is the difference between the five-year and six-month Euribor rates. SwpnVol is the implied 
volatility of at-the-money swaption of comparable maturity. DefSprd is the difference between the six-month 
Euribor and the six-month Treasury rate. LiffeVol is the logarithm of the trading volume of three-month Euribor 
futures on the LIFFE. CpTbSprd is the spread between the three-month AA Financial Commercial Paper rate and 
the three-month T-bill rate. Only the coefficients of interest are presented in this table. 
 
   
Maturity Bid Side Ask Side 
   
  
c2 
_________________ 
 
d2 
_________________ 
 
c2 
_________________ 
 
d2 
_________________ 
 
2-year 
 
0.08* 
 
0.18* 
 
0.28** 
 
0.74** 
3-year 0.07* 0.21* 0.31** 1.66** 
4-year 0.21* 0.17* 0.92** 1.39** 
5-year 0.34* 0.54** 0.71** 1.58** 
6-year 0.41** 0.43* 0.75** 1.89** 
7-year 0.31* 0.71* 0.82** 2.01** 
8-year 0.33** 1.22** 0.91** 1.54** 
9-year 0.22** 0.67** 0.65** 1.79** 
10-year 0.44** 0.91** 0.82** 1.72** 
     
** implies significance at the 5% level; * implies significance at the 10% level. 
( )
( )
CpTbSprddLiffeVoldDefSprdd*SwpnVol d
LMRdLMRdLMRdEIVddRelBAS
SlopecMratecDefSprdcSwpnVolc
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LMR
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Table 5 
 
Determinants of Liquidity and Price Using Alternative Volatility Benchmarks (ATM) 
 
This table presents the results for a simultaneous equation model, for near-the-money options with LMRs between -
0.1 and 0.1, where the excess implied volatility of euro (€) interest rate caps and floors and the relative bid-ask 
spreads are determined endogenously as a function of each other and other exogenous variables, for the sample 
period from April 1999 to May 2001: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIV is the implied volatility of the mid price of the cap/floor relative to the alternative benchmark volatilities 
(historical standard deviation of changes in log rates and swaption volatilities of comparable maturity). RelBAS is 
the bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-price. LMR is the logarithm of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of the 
option. 6Mrate is the six-month Euribor rate. Slope is the difference between the five-year and six-month Euribor 
rates. SwpnVol is the implied volatility of at-the-money swaption of comparable maturity. DefSprd is the difference 
between the six-month Euribor and the six-month Treasury rate. LiffeVol is the logarithm of the trading volume of 
three-month Euribor futures on the LIFFE. CpTbSprd is the spread between the three-month AA Financial 
Commercial Paper rate and the three-month T-bill rate. Only the coefficients of interest are presented in this table. 
 
   
Maturity Historical Standard Deviation Swaption Volatility 
   
  
c2 
_________________ 
 
d2 
_________________ 
 
c2 
_________________ 
 
d2 
_________________ 
 
2-year 
 
0.39** 
 
1.05** 
 
0.19* 
 
0.44** 
3-year 0.41** 1.56** 0.22** 0.99** 
4-year 0.55** 1.91** 0.31** 1.05** 
5-year 0.68** 2.05** 0.52** 1.51** 
6-year 0.74** 1.77** 0.45** 1.24** 
7-year 0.61** 2.15** 0.61** 1.33** 
8-year 0.79** 2.08** 0.44** 1.28** 
9-year 0.81** 1.64** 0.57** 1.69** 
10-year 0.83** 1.79** 0.63** 1.42** 
     
** implies significance at the 5% level; * implies significance at the 10% level. 
( )
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CpTbSprddLiffeVoldDefSprdd*SwpnVol d
LMRdLMRdLMRdEIVddRelBAS
SlopecMratecDefSprdcSwpnVolc
LMRcLMRcLMRcRelBASccEIV
LMR
LMR
*9*8*76                  
.1*5*4*3*21
*96*8*76                    
.1*5*4*3*21
0
2
0
2
+++
+++++=
+++
+++++=
<
<
 52 
Table 6 
 
Determinants of Liquidity and Price Across Strikes 
 
This table presents the results for a simultaneous equation model estimated separately using bid, mid and ask prices 
across all available strikes, where the excess implied volatility of euro (€) interest rate caps and floors and the 
relative bid-ask spreads are determined endogenously as a function of each other and other exogenous variables, for 
the sample period from April 1999 to May 2001: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIV is the implied volatility of the bid or the ask price of the cap/floor relative to the benchmark volatility estimated 
using a panel GARCH model on historical interest rates. RelBAS is the bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-price. 
LMR is the logarithm of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of the option. 6Mrate is the six-month Euribor 
rate. Slope is the difference between the five-year and six-month Euribor rates. SwpnVol is the implied volatility of 
at-the-money swaption of comparable maturity. DefSprd is the difference between the six-month Euribor and the 
six-month Treasury rate. Skew is the skewness of the historical distribution of interest rates. Kurt is the excess 
kurtosis of the historical distribution of interest rates. LiffeVol is the logarithm of the trading volume of three-month 
Euribor futures on the LIFFE. CpTbSprd is the spread between the three-month AA Financial Commercial Paper 
rate and the three-month T-bill rate. Only the coefficients of interest are presented in this table. 
 
    
Maturity Bid Prices Mid Prices Ask Prices 
    
  
c2 
___________ 
 
d2 
___________ 
 
c2 
___________ 
 
d2 
___________ 
 
c2 
___________ 
 
d2 
___________ 
 
2-year 
 
0.04 
 
0.07 
 
0.18* 
 
0.92* 
 
0.33** 
 
1.19** 
3-year 0.09* 0.03 0.31** 0.78* 0.61** 1.75** 
4-year 0.13* 0.08* 0.54** 1.07** 0.54** 1.22** 
5-year 0.10* 0.15* 0.21** 0.99** 0.78** 1.49** 
6-year 0.22* 0.49* 0.46** 1.22** 1.02** 1.85** 
7-year 0.25** 1.03** 0.55** 1.10** 0.91** 2.42** 
8-year 0.19* 0.57* 0.63** 1.45** 0.76** 1.66** 
9-year 0.29** 0.89** 0.72** 1.51** 0.82** 2.34** 
10-year 0.34** 1.24** 0.57** 1.09** 0.93** 1.73** 
       
** implies significance at the 5% level; * implies significance at the 10% level. 
( )
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Table 7 
 
Determinants of Liquidity and Price Across Strikes Using Alternative Volatility Measures 
 
This table presents the results for a simultaneous equation model estimated separately using mid prices across all 
available strikes, where the excess implied volatility of euro (€) interest rate caps and floors and the relative bid-ask 
spreads are determined endogenously as a function of each other and other exogenous variables, for the sample 
period from April 1999 to May 2001: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIV is the implied volatility of the mid price of the cap/floor relative to the alternative benchmark volatilities 
(standard deviation of changes in log rates as well as swaption volatilities of comparable maturity). RelBAS is the 
bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-price. LMR is the logarithm of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of the 
option. 6Mrate is the six-month Euribor rate. Slope is the difference between the five-year and six-month Euribor 
rates. SwpnVol is the implied volatility of at-the-money swaption of comparable maturity. DefSprd is the difference 
between the six-month Euribor and the six-month Treasury rate. Skew is the skewness of the historical distribution 
of interest rates. Kurt is the excess  of the historical distribution of interest rates. LiffeVol is the logarithm of the 
trading volume of three-month Euribor futures on the LIFFE. CpTbSprd is the spread between the three-month AA 
Financial Commercial Paper rate and the three-month T-bill rate. Only the coefficients of interest are presented in 
this table. 
 
   
Maturity Historical Volatility Swaption Volatility 
   
  
c2 
_________________ 
 
d2 
_________________ 
 
c2 
_________________ 
 
d2 
_________________ 
 
2-year 
 
0.32* 
 
0.88* 
 
0.19* 
 
0.49* 
3-year 0.45** 1.05** 0.52* 0.78** 
4-year 0.61** 1.31** 0.44** 1.55** 
5-year 0.52** 1.07** 0.29** 1.41** 
6-year 0.49** 2.11** 0.22** 1.29** 
7-year 0.65** 1.55** 0.54** 2.67** 
8-year 0.79** 1.71** 0.65** 2.51** 
9-year 0.68** 2.03** 0.27** 2.13** 
10-year 0.72** 1.48** 0.33** 1.45** 
     
** implies significance at the 5% level; * implies significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 8 
 
Determinants of Changes in Excess Implied Volatility and Bid-Ask Spreads (ATM) 
 
This table presents the results for a simultaneous equation model, for near-the-money options with LMRs between -
0.1 and 0.1, where daily changes in the excess implied volatility of euro (€) interest rate caps and floors and daily 
changes in the relative bid-ask spreads are determined endogenously as a function of each other and of changes in 
other exogenous variables, for the sample period from April 1999 to May 2001: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIV is the implied volatility of the mid-price of the cap/floor relative to the benchmark volatility estimated using a 
panel GARCH model on historical interest rates. RelBAS is the bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-price. LMR is the 
logarithm of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of the option. 6Mrate is the six-month Euribor rate. Slope is 
the difference between the five-year and six-month Euribor rates. SwpnVol is the implied volatility of at-the-money 
swaption of comparable maturity. DefSprd is the difference between the six-month Euribor and the six-month 
Treasury rate. LiffeVol is the logarithm of the trading volume of three-month Euribor futures on the LIFFE. 
CpTbSprd is the spread between the three-month AA Financial Commercial Paper rate and the three-month T-bill 
rate. Only the coefficients of interest are presented in this table. 
 
Panel A: Changes in EIV as the dependent variable 
 
Maturity c2 c6 c7 c8 
 
c9 Obs R2 
2-year 0.47* 0.59* 0.00 -1.37 1.36* 1090 0.07 
3-year 1.09* 8.40 0.01 -2.30* 1.03 1364 0.05 
4-year 0.63* 0.87** 0.07* -4.55* 2.69 1439 0.06 
5-year 0.93** 1.04* 0.03 -3.79* 2.23 1404 0.07 
6-year 1.80* 1.04* 0.02** -1.29* 3.48 1429 0.09 
7-year 3.29** 2.84 0.01* -3.68 4.77 1367 0.11 
8-year 3.75* 5.14* 0.01 -0.81** 1.55 1149 0.12 
9-year 4.87* 4.11* 0.09 -6.47* -1.00 1112 0.14 
10-year 2.87** 3.92* 0.01 -1.11** -3.16 886 0.09 
        
 
Panel B: Changes in RelBAS as the dependent variable 
 
Maturity d2 d6 d7 d8 
 
d9 Obs R2 
2-year 2.86 1.14** 0.00 -0.08 0.01 1090 0.03 
3-year 2.84** 0.08** 0.00 -0.03 0.05 1364 0.09 
4-year 0.14** 0.58* 0.07 -0.02* 0.01 1439 0.07 
5-year 0.44* 0.82** 0.03* -0.02** 0.00 1404 0.06 
6-year 0.56* 0.76** 0.03 -0.03** -0.01 1429 0.06 
7-year 1.65** 0.98** 0.08 -0.04** -0.01 1367 0.09 
8-year 0.22** 1.34** 0.03* -0.02** 0.00 1149 0.13 
9-year 0.45** 1.02** 0.02* -0.01** 0.00 1112 0.13 
10-year 0.12** 0.88* 0.04 -0.01** 0.00 886 0.12 
        
 
** implies significance at the 5% level; * implies significance at the 10% level.  
( )
( )
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Table 9 
 
Correlations Among Relative Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
This table presents average time-series correlations between relative bid-ask spreads across moneyness buckets (at-
the-money (ATM), in-the-money (ITM) and out-of-the-money (OTM) of euro (€) interest rate caps and floors. The 
numbers below are averaged across the correlations between the nine maturities within each moneyness bucket. For 
example, the OTM/OTM value is the average correlation between bid-ask spreads for each of the nine maturities 
within OTM options (so it is an average of (9 x 8)/2; that is, 36 correlations). The OTM/ITM value is the average 
correlation between bid-ask spreads for each maturity for OTM options with those for each maturity for ITM options 
(so it is an average of 9 x 9, or 81, correlations), and so on. The correlations are calculated for the sample period 
from January 1999 to May 2001. 
 
 
 
Average Correlations 
 OTM ATM ITM 
OTM 0.68   
ATM 0.34 0.86  
ITM 0.24 0.65 0.78 
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Table 10 
 
Determinants of Changes in Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
This table presents results of a panel regression of changes in relative bid-ask spreads on changes in excess implied 
volatility of mid-price and changes in the moneyness variables of euro (€) interest rate caps and floors. 
 
 
 
 
EIV is the implied volatility of the mid-price of cap/floor relative to the benchmark volatility estimated using a panel 
GARCH model on historical interest rates. RelBAS is the bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-price. LMR (Log 
Moneyness Ratio) is the log of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of cap/floor. Δ indicates the first 
difference. There are 27 groups (i = 1 to 27) in the panel (nine maturities - two-year to ten-year X three moneyness 
groups - at-the-money, out-of-the-money and in-the-money for each maturity). The table presents GLS estimates for 
the sample period from April 1999 to May 2001.  
  
 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 Obs Adj R2 p-value for F statistic 
 
Coefficient -0.024 0.248 0.423 0.163 -0.556 44070 0.0907 0.000 
t-stats -2.60 4.52 3.94 1.90 -2.69    
         
 
( ) ititLMRitititit LMRcLMRcLMRcEIVccRelBAS ε+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ < .1*5 *4*3*21 02
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Table 11 
 
Commonality in Changes in Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
This table presents the structure of the principal components of the correlation matrix of the residuals obtained from 
the panel regression: 
 ( ) itLMRitit LMRcLMRcLMRcEIVccRelBAS ε+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ < .1*5*4*3*21 02  
 
EIV is the implied volatility of the mid-price of the option relative to the benchmark volatility estimated using a 
GARCH model on historical interest rates. RelBAS is the bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-price. LMR is the 
logarithm of the ratio of the swap rate to the strike rate of the option. Δ indicates first difference. There are 27 
groups in the panel consisting of nine maturities (two years to ten years) for the three moneyness groups (at-the-
money, out-of-the-money and in-the-money). The regression is estimated for the sample period from April 1999 to 
May 2001, based on data on euro (€) interest rate caps and floors. 
   
 Principal Component 
  1 2 3 
Eigenvalue  9.04 2.87 1.41 
% explained  0.33 0.11 0.05 
________________________________________________________ 
Moneyness Maturity Eigenvectors 
OTM 2-year 0.18 -0.06 0.29 
OTM 3-year 0.23 -0.15 0.17 
OTM  4-year 0.28 -0.18 0.00 
OTM 5-year 0.27 -0.10 0.05 
OTM  6-year 0.30 -0.11 0.04 
OTM 7-year 0.29 -0.02 0.08 
OTM 8-year 0.33 -0.00 0.02 
OTM 9-year 0.31 -0.06 -0.02 
OTM 10-year 0.26 -0.01 0.05 
ATM 2-year 0.13 0.03 0.05 
ATM 3-year 0.17 0.04 0.07 
ATM 4-year 0.20 0.00 -0.11 
ATM 5-year 0.14 0.05 -0.13 
ATM 6-year 0.21 0.15 0.10 
ATM 7-year 0.19 0.12 0.07 
ATM 8-year 0.24 0.07 -0.15 
ATM 9-year 0.26 0.06 0.11 
ATM 10-year 0.14 0.14 -0.22 
ITM 2-year 0.01 0.11 0.55 
ITM 3-year 0.00 0.36 0.28 
ITM 4-year 0.06 0.41 -0.02 
ITM 5-year 0.01 0.40 0.00 
ITM 6-year 0.00 0.42 0.07 
ITM 7-year 0.08 0.36 0.09 
ITM 8-year 0.11 0.19 -0.52 
ITM 9-year 0.07 0.16 -0.28 
ITM 10-year 0.13 0.07 0.02 
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Table 12 
 
Macro-Economic Determinants of the Systematic Liquidity Factor 
 
This table presents the results of the regression of the first principal component of the correlation matrix of residuals 
(from the panel regression in Table 10) on contemporaneous and lagged changes in macro-financial variables. 
6Mrate is the six-month Euribor. Slope is the difference between the five-year and six-month Euribor rates. DefSprd 
is the difference between six-month Euribor and the six-month Treasury rate. DAXVol is the implied volatility of 
DAX index options. SwpnVol is the implied volatility of at-the-money swaption of comparable maturity. The 
regression is estimated for the sample period from April 1999 to May 2001, based on data on euro (€) interest rate 
caps and floors. 
 
 
 Coefficient t-stats 
Constant -0.11 -1.02 
6Mrate   
Contemporaneous 0.19 0.71 
Lag 1 0.55 0.30 
Lag 2 4.21 1.01 
Lag 3 1.98 0.45 
Lag 4 5.15 0.62 
Slope   
Contemporaneous 0.22 0.30 
Lag 1 1.49 0.89 
Lag 2 4.61 1.44 
Lag 3 2.35 1.17 
Lag 4 2.88 1.22 
DefSprd   
Contemporaneous 0.49 0.62 
Lag 1 -1.33 -1.08 
Lag 2 -2.15 -1.26 
Lag 3 1.50 0.95 
Lag 4 1.37 1.33 
DAXVol   
Contemporaneous 0.05 0.79 
Lag 1 0.23 1.87 
Lag 2 0.31 2.33 
Lag 3 0.19 2.12 
Lag 4 0.08 1.75 
SwpnVol   
Contemporaneous 0.17 1.72 
Lag 1 0.35 2.12 
Lag 2 0.52 2.78 
Lag 3 0.45 2.65 
Lag 4 0.29 1.99 
R2  0.28 
p-value for F-stat  0.00 
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Panel A: Panel GARCH volatility as benchmark 
 
 
Panel B: Historical standard deviation as benchmark 
 
 
Panel C: Swaption implied volatility as benchmark 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Volatility smiles using alternative benchmark volatilities. This figure presents scatter plots 
showing the shape of the volatility smiles for the excess implied flat volatilities of euro (€) interest rate caps and 
floors, using three alternative benchmark volatilities - panel GARCH volatility, historical standard deviation and 
swaption implied volatility - over the sample period April 1999 to May 2001. The plots are presented for three 
representative maturities – two, five, and ten years. The plots for the other maturities are similar. 
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Panel A: Panel GARCH volatility as benchmark 
 
 
Panel B: Historical standard deviation as benchmark 
 
Panel C: Swaption implied volatility as benchmark 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Plots of excess implied volatility versus liquidity. This figure presents three sample scatter plots 
of the excess implied volatility of euro (€) interest rate caps and floors for the three benchmark volatilities - panel 
GARCH volatility, historical standard deviation and swaption implied volatility. The graphs show the relationship 
between the EIV and the RelBAS for two, five, and ten-year maturity caps and floors. The plots for other maturities 
are similar. The plots are constructed using data for euro (€) interest rate caps and floors over the sample period 
April 1999 to May 2001. 
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Figure 3. Time variation in relative bid-ask spreads. This figure presents the time-series plots of the 
relative bid-ask spreads of euro (€) caps and floors for each of the nine maturities (from two years to ten years), 
separately by moneyness, over the sample period January 1999 to May 2001. Each plot has nine time series 
representing the nine option maturities. The out-of-the-money (OTM) bucket contains caps with LMRs less than -
0.1 and floors with LMRs greater than 0.1. The in-the-money (ITM) bucket contains caps with LMRs greater than 
0.1 and floors with LMRs less than -0.1. The at-the-money (ATM) bucket contains caps and floors with LMRs 
between -0.1 and 0.1. 
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